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Preface: On the Problem of Freedom

We are told that people die for the sake of freedom, but no one can tell us what freedom is.
The story goes that the political revolutions of the modern West have all taken place in the name
of freedom, as have the great popular movements. The Korean War memorial in Washington D.C.
reads, “Freedom Is Not Free,” which suggests that the death and suffering of those American
soldiers, and perhaps all American soldiers, was for the sake of freedom. Yet the word ‘freedom’
is as resistant to definition as ‘truth’, ‘being’ and the like. In the United States we have a commonsense notion of Freedom, but it does not hold up to philosophical scrutiny. According to this notion,
Freedom is the absence of external constraint: “freedom of speech” means that the government
will not prevent us from speaking, “freedom of religion” means that the government will not
prevent us from worshipping, etc. But this is a purely negative conception of freedom. It places
restrictions on how the society may influence the individual, but it does not demand that the society
provide anything positive to the individual in order to promote its freedom. For instance, is a person
truly free to speak if he or she has not been educated in how to think and use language? Or is a
person truly free to worship if the society does not provide a time and space outside of the
commercial and domestic spheres for worship to take place? This notion of freedom also neglects
the fact that individuals may limit each other’s freedom directly, that is, without the mediation of
any social apparatus. Must not a free society protect its individuals from each other? That means
installing external constraints upon every individual.
The deepest flaw with our common-sense notion of freedom, however, is its premise that
the individual is free in itself. It is as though the individual is a spontaneous source of freedom, a
source which the society places blockages around a posteriori, and that the simple removal of
social blockages will allow the individual’s freedom to pour forth. It is clear, however, that an
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individual does not need social constraints to be unfree. An extremely privileged or isolated person
may still be enslaved by ignorance or bad habits. Again, the common-sense notion of freedom is
purely negative: it does not demand that the individual provide anything positive either. In this
way our common-sense notion of freedom is similar to a philosophical conception of freedom. The
latter is to be met with in writings such as Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy and Sartre’s
Existentialism is a Humanism. According to these writings the very nature of the human will is to
be free, so that every human being is free insofar as it wills. While such a theory is ostensibly more
philosophical, it is even more flawed than our common-sense notion because it utterly dilutes the
concept of freedom. It states that the decisions of slaves, prisoners and drug addicts are made
freely. Neither this nor our common-sense notion of freedom can be accepted as a true definition.
There is also the problem of determinism, which will not receive extensive treatment here
as it is a metaphysical issue, whereas our concern here is ethical. The significance of determinism
in regards to freedom as an ethical concept is highly limited. Once determinism is introduced into
ethics a child becomes just as free as an adult, a dog just as free as its owner and, if freedom and
happiness are treated as distinct concepts, as they should be, a slave just as free as its master. To
be sure, such an equality of freedom is a trivial one because a determinist1 would take all ‘freedom’
to be illusory. While that may be metaphysically interesting, it prevents us from having important
and rational conversations about the ethical status of societies and individuals. Besides,
metaphysical problems arise for determinism at the point where ethics and metaphysics meet. Even
if all human behaviors are reducible to physical causality it is nonetheless clear that this sort of
physical causality is not of the same order as that of billiard balls colliding with one another. The
human body is formally constituted as to have desires, memories, reasoning, etc. and billiard balls
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Not Spinoza, who understood the distinction between the metaphysical and the ethical implications of determinism
with his usual genius.
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are not. To not recognize this distinction is to deny any role to form in causality, which is simply
an error. As it stands, the formal properties of the human body make freedom an issue for human
beings. Whether such properties are the epiphenomena of waves and particles is not germane to
ethical inquiry.
Someone might object that the proper way to integrate determinism into ethics is to
abandon any ethics centered around freedom and replace it with an ethics centered around
happiness, which would be utilitarianism. Utilitarianism will, like determinism, not receive much
treatment here. To refute its doctrine would be pleasurable but not therefore good. One can, in
principle, seek out a definition for freedom without any reference to utilitarianism. Utilitarianism
erects happiness as the highest moral value and treats freedom as either nonexistent or subordinate;
therefore it is silent on the definition of freedom.
Utilitarianism would not be silent on the definition of freedom if freedom and happiness
were identical or interrelated, but they are not. Freedom is an ethical concept and happiness is a
psychological concept. Furthermore, a quick consideration of the facts of experience reveals that
they do not follow from identical causes. Ignorance and comfort can cause happiness, but they
only impede freedom. Likewise, laziness and the avoidance of risk may cause happiness in some
cases, but they can never cause freedom. The statement “Freedom Is Not Free” suggests that
something must be sacrificed for the sake of freedom, and this something cannot be anything other
than a cause or causes of happiness. If it were not a cause or causes of happiness then the giving
up of it would not be a sacrifice, unless it were a cause or causes of freedom, in which case it
would be contradictory to sacrifice it for the sake of freedom. There are, of course, things which
prevent both freedom and happiness, such as poverty and all of the forms of brutality. For this
reason events which preclude or undo such things can cause both freedom and happiness
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simultaneously. Such simultaneity nonetheless does not imply that the two are brought about in
the same way. Freedom also may cause happiness if it is treated as a valued goal, because the
approach and realization of a valued goal is something that causes happiness, but not because of
any internal property of freedom. Happiness never directly produces freedom; if anything, people
who are happy are less likely to pursue freedom for themselves and others. The causal relationship
between freedom and happiness is therefore accidental, i.e., when they are causally connected it is
not due to their respective natures but rather to the mediation of a contingent third factor. Their
accidental relationship implies that freedom and happiness are distinct from one another. Therefore
utilitarianism, which is essentially concerned with happiness, has nothing to contribute to the
definition of freedom.
And so the problem of freedom remains and is of the utmost importance. The definition of
freedom is the lapis ethicorum. Where happiness fails to provide a rational and moral telos for
human behavior, freedom appears as the most promising alternative. When David Foster Wallace
asks, “Is the real point of my life simply to undergo as little pain and as much pleasure as possible?
But isn’t this kind of a selfish way to live? Forget selfish – isn’t it awful lonely?”2 freedom is the
alternative he is seeking. When human action is directed towards freedom as its absolute goal
nihilism, hedonism and pessimism disintegrate: nihilism because freedom is a goal that does not
devalue itself or give way to some other, equally finite goal; hedonism because freedom is not
happiness; and pessimism because pessimism arises from the despair of nihilism and the failure of
hedonism. All of this is, of course, empty verbiage from the present point of view. It does however
apprise us of the importance of defining freedom. If an absolute definition of freedom were

2

David Foster Wallace, Consider the Lobster: And Other Essays, ny uppl. ed. (New York: Little, Brown &
Company, 2007), 261.
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produced then, in theory if not in practice, life as an ethical problem would be solved, and with it
‘the riddle of history’. It would give us something that makes life worth living.
But an absolute definition of freedom will not be attempted or put forward here. Instead of
coming to our own definition, we will merely draw attention to the importance of the problem of
freedom and to the work done on it by one particular thinker: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
Hegel’s theory of freedom is valuable for a number of reasons. The most obvious of these
is, in true Hegelian fashion, its place in the history of philosophy. Many if not all of the most
influential theories of freedom in the continental tradition bear a direct Hegelian influence. Marx,
of course, characterizes his own thought as Hegel turned on his head; Kierkegaard spares no ink
in declaring war on ‘the System’, even while adopting Hegel’s dialectical method; Heidegger’s
notion of authenticity as determined by the historicity of Dasein is markedly Hegelian; Sartre’s
locating of freedom in the negativity of consciousness is torn almost directly from the pages of the
Phenomenology of Spirit; and even the schizoanalytic nomadism of Deleuze and Guattari is a
direct, if antagonistic, response to Hegel’s ‘aborescent’ dialectic. Foucault’s statement that
contemporary philosophers may be doomed to find Hegel waiting patiently at the end of every
road we travel should perhaps be altered to say that Hegel is instead at the beginning of every road
we travel, although he may be waiting at the end as well.
In similarly Hegelian fashion, the negative determination of Hegel’s theory of freedom also
makes it valuable. Since we wish to progress towards an encompassing definition of freedom it is
best to concentrate on theories of freedom that are disparate from one another. If we evaluate
theories of freedom that overlap or are identical with one another then we are making redundant
use of our efforts. Hegel’s theory of freedom then benefits from being highly novel, at least
according to Hegel. Hegel rejects what we have called our common-sense notion of freedom for
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the same reasons put forward here, namely, that it is wholly negative. Although he thinks that the
will is free in-itself, like Descartes and Sartre, he sees this as an inchoate, merely potential freedom
that must be made actual. Hegel rejects the egalitarian conception of freedom found in Rousseau
and embodied in the French Revolution – a conception of freedom that reappears in Marxism and
much of subsequent leftist thought. Hegel rejects all transcendent conceptions of freedom, such as
those met with in stoicism and religious asceticism, as overly abstract and divorced from social
reality. Finally, Hegel rejects the conception of freedom developed by his great antecedent
Immanuel Kant. Hegel devotes an exceptional amount of space to critiquing Kant’s moral
philosophy, especially in the Phenomenology of Spirit, because he sees it as highly sophisticated
yet still not in possession of the truth. Hegel’s own conception of freedom then seems to be a
strange island of its own, far away from any of the usual ideas that make their way into our popular
discourse.
Problems ensue when it comes to identifying the positive side of Hegel’s theory of
freedom. Hegel’s philosophical motto is to ‘tarry with the negative’ and so it is generally easier to
determine which views Hegel opposes than which he assumes. The difficulty is, of course,
exacerbated by Hegel’s notorious obscurity. Thus in order to approach Hegel’s positive conception
freedom, we might go through another one of Hegel’s concepts, Spirit, which receives much more
direct treatment in his writings. Fortunately, Hegel sees Spirit and freedom as fundamentally linked
to one another:
The nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite – matter.
The essence of matter is gravity, the essence of Spirit – its substance – is freedom.
It is immediately plausible to everyone that, among other properties, Spirit also
possesses freedom. But philosophy teaches us that all the properties of Spirit exist
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only through freedom. All are but means of attaining freedom; all seek and produce
this and this alone.3

The problem is then identifying what Spirit is supposed to be. The nature of Spirit will be treated
both directly and indirectly in the sequel, but for now we can begin with a highly provisional and
incomplete definition: Spirit is the ideal structure of human social activity. For Hegel, culture,
politics, history, religion and the like are all organized and innervated by Spirit. The meaning of
the popular term ‘Zeitgeist’ – literally ‘time-spirit’ – is surprisingly close to Hegel’s concept
‘Volksgeist’ or ‘spirit of a nation’, considering how philosophical concepts are usually botched in
the popular imagination. 4 Spirit also changes by developing itself dialectically, and the
development of Spirit is the Hegelian definition of history. That history is the history of Spirit
means that Spirit is not meant to be a transcendent entity, as its name might suggest, but that it in
fact exists and develops itself only by taking part in phenomenal reality. Thus Hegel says, “where
Spirit is ... manifestation itself is the essential. The criterion of Spirit is its action, its active essence
… In regard to Spirit one cannot set aside its manifestations.”5 Therefore, since Spirit has freedom
as its essence, and Spirit is one with its concrete manifestations, in seeking to understand Hegel’s
conception of freedom we must look to the manifestation of Spirit that Hegel takes to be the most
complete, or where Spirit blooms into its fullest development – what Hegel would call ‘Absolute
Spirit’.
Unfortunately, Hegel gives conflicting accounts of what constitutes the manifestation of
Absolute Spirit. In Hegel’s first mature work, the Phenomenology of Spirit, he argues that what he
calls ‘reconciliation’ is the manifestation of Absolute Spirit, saying, “The word of reconciliation
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G. W. F. Hegel, Reason In History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History, trans. Robert S. Hartman
(New York, NY: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953), 22.
4
e.g., Ubermensch.
5
Hegel, Reason In History, 51.
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is the objectively existent Spirit … a reciprocal recognition which is absolute Spirit.” 6
Reconciliation is a social form in which individuals mutually repent to and forgive one another. It
appears at the end of the section discussing morality in the Phenomenology, and so, according to
Hegel’s dialectical logic, reconciliation is also meant to be the highest manifestation of moral
action. Given that Hegel explicitly works within a post-Kantian tradition that equates morality
with freedom, this confirms our supposition that the manifestation of Absolute Spirit corresponds
to the highest expression of freedom. It would seem then that through the mere analysis of
reconciliation we can ascertain Hegel’s conception of freedom. However, in Hegel’s later writings,
specifically his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Elements of the Philosophy of Right,
and Lectures on the Philosophy of History, he posits a different social form, or ‘shape of Spirit’,
than reconciliation as the manifestation of Absolute Spirit: the state. In the Philosophy of Right
Hegel says, “the State in and for itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of Freedom … The
State is Spirit which is present in the world and which consciously realizes itself therein.” 7 The
state is, generically, a modern federal government with a constitution. As we see in the quote
above, the state is characterized by Hegel as the fullest realization of both freedom and Spirit. It is
obvious, even from the sparse accounts of reconciliation and the state presented here, that they are
radically different, to the point where even to compare the two seems like a category mistake. Thus
two possibilities present themselves: either Hegel changed his mind about his conception of
freedom in passing from the Phenomenology to his later philosophy, or there is a deeper level of
analysis at which reconciliation and the State reveal themselves as equivalent or interpenetrating.
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G. W. F Hegel and J. N. Findlay, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, reprint. ed. (Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1977), 408.
7
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. Hugh Barr Nisbet
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 279.
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The goal of what follows will be to determine which of these above possibilities are true,
or whether some third, synthetic interpretation is required. The question of what Hegel’s
conception of freedom is, and whether it is consistent across his mature philosophy, will be pursued
as well. These two questions will be brought to bear on each other because, as we shall see, one
cannot be answered without the other being answered as well. Our strategy for answering these
two questions will be to carry out detailed exegeses and analyses of the passages from Hegel that
are the most relevant to our two questions. Thus the Lordship and Bondage dialectic from the
Phenomenology of Spirit will receive an exegesis and analysis, as it contains the basic conceptual
formulations that Hegel employs throughout his entire theory of freedom; the ‘Morality’ section
of the Phenomenology will receive an exegesis and analysis, as it contains Hegel’s critique of Kant
and his account of reconciliation; and Hegel’s accounts of the state from his Encyclopedia,
Philosophy of Right and Lectures on History will be treated in combination, as important points
concerning Hegel’s theory of the state and freedom are distributed throughout the three works.
Unfortunately, Hegel’s Science of Logic, which contains his transcendental theory of freedom, will
not receive any treatment here, due to constraints on both time and length. Thus the present work
does not pretend to be a conclusive or comprehensive account of Hegel’s theory of freedom,
reconciliation or the state, but rather a largely exploratory or experimental one. This is reflected in
the fact that the sequel contains no substantial critique of Hegel’s philosophy. It may then strike
the reader that a mere adulation of Hegel is being carried out here, but that is not the intent. The
present work was written with the following principle in mind: appreciation precedes
understanding precedes critique. In dealing with a philosopher as wide-ranging and obscure as
Hegel, in tandem with the aforementioned time and length constraints, the result has been that

10
appreciation has taken up a far greater portion of the enterprise than would otherwise be preferable.
Whether understanding has thereby been attained is at the discretion of the present reader.
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Chapter 1: The Freedom of Self-Consciousness
In his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Kant bemoans the fact that thus far
philosophy has not even succeeded in proving the existence of the external world. He might have
added that philosophy has also not succeeded in proving the existence of ethics. To provide rational
grounds for how ethical facts, or even ethical judgments, are possible remains a tenacious problem
in philosophy. The existence of mathematical objects, which, like ethical “objects,” are
unobservable, is tenuous enough, even while there is some consensus over what some of them are
and what some of the methods are for determining their validity. Ethics, conversely, seems to be
utterly without bearings. But let us suppose that a universally accepted method for arriving at
ethical truths were discovered. A second, equally tenacious problem would remain untouched:
why would any individual or society behave ethically? A tentative definition of ethics might be a
canon of behaviors that are carried out on the basis of something other than self-interested
pleasure. If this is not, to some degree, what ethics is, then ethics, as a field, is nothing more than
a pretentious brand of practical wisdom. So then the problem is how it could be possible to act on
the basis of something other than self-interested pleasure, and further, why anyone would ever do
this. Traditionally, religions have answered this problem with an appeal to a retributive afterlife of
one sort or another. Such an answer is unsatisfactory both epistemologically and because it
ultimately reintroduces self-interested pleasure into ethics. Thus the task for philosophy is to give
a rational, secular account for both why and how human beings should be “good” to each other,
and not selfish or capricious only.
But what’s so special about human beings anyway? In the view handed down to us by
popular science, human beings are so unexceptional as to be indistinguishable from the arbitrary,
dynamic manifold of ‘the universe’. We consist of the same subatomic particles and wave
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identities as everything else. In turn these subatomic elements emerge out of energy, which,
without meaning or intent, is pushed in and out of itself into the forms accorded to it by the laws
of physics. These forms of nature distribute themselves through the indefinitely vast container of
spacetime, within which the Earth is a speck orbiting a speck orbiting a speck. Yet while the
human’s matter and its position in the cosmos is unexceptional, some will nonetheless grant that
our form places us within a peculiar category: that of life. Organisms are indeed notable for their
complexity, i.e., their advanced internal topology. They appear to be able to continuously
appropriate and expel matter while maintaining their complex form, and appear to also possess
their own internal sources of locomotion. Their activity nonetheless remains reducible, in
principle, to the same forces that produce everything else. From a pure point of view, organisms
are but one type of the random aggregates of energy being pushed into itself; to even individuate
them within the flux of the universe is a mere pragmatic simplification; and among such pseudoentities we find the human.
But there is something strange about the above view, which is that it was created by
humans. Even stranger, when the humans who are reading, writing or thinking about this view
leave that activity and return to their everyday existence they are bound to discover a strange fact:
the world is made out of things, like clouds and cups and words, and among these things humans
are not only special but the most important things in the world. Energy, so far as everyday
experience is concerned, is nowhere to be found. From within the safety of abstraction, the theorist
may profess any view he likes, but simply try to harm or have sex with one of his close relations
and his true philosophy will appear. Some might protest that here we are reverting to a limited,
human perspective on reality. Much to their disadvantage, however, there is no other perspective
to be found. The predictive models of science and their interpretations are ineluctably human and
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historical in their origin. People also speak of the wisdom of trees or of dogs, but in truth they are
speaking of the wisdom of human interpretations of trees and dogs. Nature is silent on every
question we pose to it, as that is what makes it Nature. If in attempting to overstep our human
perspective we produce theories that erase the most basic features of experience, such as the
existence of individuated things or what we call ‘consciousness’, which is really experience itself,
then it is the theories that are at fault – experience remains untouched.
The failure of the popular view of science to capture the essence of the very life that
produces it is where we find our impetus to rediscover humanistic and phenomenological
philosophies such as that of Hegel. In returning to our original question, ‘what’s so special about
human beings anyway?’ the preceding already indicates Hegel’s answer to this question. For
Hegel, humans are special for a myriad of reasons, but they all spring from a single proximate and
final cause: humans are self-conscious. To be more precisely Hegelian one might say that we are
self-consciousness, which is to say that self-consciousness is not merely a property we have but
rather that it defines our most fundamental being. It is crucial to note, however, that Hegel does
not mean by ‘self-consciousness’ what is commonly understood by it. He is not referring to a
private mental state in which we introspect on the brute fact of our own consciousness. The
colloquial meaning of being ‘self-conscious’, denoting social anxiety, is much closer to Hegel’s
meaning. What Hegel means by self-consciousness refers primarily to human behaviors. Humans
are aware of themselves as finite thinking beings, but this awareness and this thought are not for
Hegel, something abstract and mental but rather a species of collective human activity. Humans
create artworks and write books, we form religions and investigate Nature, and above all we form
societies and have a history. Through these activities we work out our role in our cosmos and in
our societies. One might argue that these activities are the expression of our self-consciousness
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rather than our self-consciousness itself, but for Hegel that is a meaningless distinction. It is
therefore on the basis of such ‘spiritual’ activities, as Hegel would call them, that Hegel says we
are self-consciousness. Even if we deny his conclusion, such spiritual activities are undoubtedly
what make us, human beings, special.
It is on the basis of self-consciousness that Hegel seeks to erect the edifice of ethics. In
order to see how he attempts this we must first grasp what Hegel understands by selfconsciousness. Therefore we must consult the Lordship and Bondage dialectic from the
Phenomenology of Spirit. The Lordship and Bondage dialectic, also called the ‘Master-Slave
dialectic’, is to Hegel what Irma’s Injection is to Freud: the original and formative case study that
has been reanalysed to death by countless pupils and critics. For better or for worse, the Lordship
and Bondage dialectic remains the point of entry for Hegel’s social and ethical thought, what he
calls ‘Objective Spirit’. In his Philosophy of Spirit Hegel designates Lordship and Bondage as “the
emergence of man’s social life and the commencement of the political,” 8 although in incomplete
form, of course. The Lordship and Bondage dialectic must be reckoned with because it is there,
fundamentally, that Hegel gives his rational, secular account for both why and how human beings
should be good to each other, and not selfish or capricious only.
The Lordship and Bondage dialectic is, as Hegel scholar Robert Solomon put it, a parable.9
It tells a story about two people discovering each other for the first time. Hegel knew that such an
event never really occurred; in his Philosophy of History he refers to the state of nature as, “one of
those nebulous images … without sufficient historical justification.”10 The story of the Lordship
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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the 'Encyclopaedia of the
Philosophical Sciences' (1830), comp. Ludwig Boumann, trans. Arnold V. Miller and William Wallace, reprinted
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Oxford University Press, 1985), 443.
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and Bondage dialectic is rather meant to express a number general ideas, and it is supposed to be
open to interpretation. It can be read as an account of how individuals come to terms with others
in the course of their development, or of why different groups of people seek to oppress each other,
or as psychic drama between the ego and the id, or even as a theory of how Judaism became
monotheistic. In all of these the central theme is a struggle for recognition. Hegel says just before
the Lordship and Bondage section of the Phenomenology, “a self-consciousness exists for a selfconsciousness; only so is it in fact self-consciousness,”11 and that is what he seeks to prove in the
dialectic. What the above quote means is that I only become aware of myself as the particular
individual that I am through my encounters with other people, i.e., I need a special sort of
recognition from others in order to become self-conscious. The sort of recognition selfconsciousness requires is a recognition of its freedom, which, Hegel argues, is the truth and
ultimate content of self-consciousness.
Hegel’s parable of recognition begins in the state of nature. A solitary consciousness, which
again may equally represent an individual or a nation, lives out in the wilderness. It lives entirely
according to its appetitive desires. Its subjectivity is characterized only as the negative essence of
the world, where “the Ego is, so to speak, the crucible and fire through which the indifferent
multiplicity is consumed and reduced to unity.”12 Such unity is entirely indeterminate, or rather it
is the unity of indeterminacy. As such consciousness only negates the difference and determinacy
of Nature. Behaviorally, therefore, it is characterized by the sheer consumption of natural
resources, and it is certain of itself only through this consumption: “it destroys the independent
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Hegel and Findlay, Phenomenology of Spirit, 110.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, with the Zusatze: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of
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object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as true certainty.” 13 Its self-certainty never
becomes concrete, however. Consciousness would be certain of itself in its relation to the object,
but its relation to the object is one of immediate negativity, and so it loses its object in the very
moment of relating to it. The passive objects of Nature cannot withstand the negativity of
consciousness; they wither away immediately into the abyss of the Ego. Thus consciousness is
lead about endlessly in unfulfilled repetition, a repetition without development or history. What
self-certainty therefore needs is an object that can withstand the negativity of consciousness, an
object that raises itself above the flux of Nature, that goes beyond the relative negativity of
substance, which maintains itself in the negation of its particular predicates, to the absolute
negativity of subject, which maintains itself in the negation of predicates as such:

On account of the independence of the object, therefore, it can achieve satisfaction
only when the object itself effects the negation within itself; and it must carry out
this negation of itself in itself, for it is itself the negative, and must be for the other
what it is. Since the object is in its own self negation, and in being so is at the same
time independent, it is consciousness … [Thus] self-consciousness achieves its
satisfaction only in self-consciousness.14

Consciousness needs an other to be self-certain, to become self-consciousness, and likewise the
other needs consciousness. Put somewhat more concretely, “self-consciousness exists in and for
itself when, and by the fact that, it exists for another; that is it exists only in being acknowledged.”15
When I encounter another person and thereby apprehend his or her properties, one of the properties
I must apprehend is that the other person is apprehending me; that is the source of selfconsciousness.
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self-consciousness

Hegel and Findlay, Phenomenology of Spirit, 109.
Ibid, 110.
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objectification in the other, with the same movement taking place on the part of the other. By some
deus ex machina, the other appears in our parable just when its need is felt, and the story moves
from the state of nature to the stage of history.
Self-consciousness, having found its proper object in the other, proceeds to apprehend the
other as it did the natural objects. Specifically, self-consciousness apprehends the other’s
apprehending of it. Here another problem emerges. The apprehending of self-conscious still
functions as the absolute negativity of subjectivity. Thus the recognition of self-consciousness by
the other is in fact the negation of self-consciousness by the other, not the affirmation that selfconsciousness requires. Self-certainty is thereby thwarted again. Consciousness has also lost its
status as the negative essence of the world. Instead, self-consciousness finds itself reduced to an
object that is being negated in the other’s subjectivity. The same conflict takes place from the point
of view of the other; the relation is reciprocal. From an absolute perspective, we can see that selfconsciousness is in fact a singular phenomenon that spans both self and other, that “each is for the
other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and
each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, which at the same time
is such through this mediation.” 16 Therefore any development on the one side is always
immediately related to a corresponding development on the other side.
Self and other, equally confronted with objectification, must assert themselves as subject
and not merely substance in order to be recognized and thereby self-certain as “the purely negative
being of self-identical consciousness.”17 For each, this self-assertion before the other “consists in
showing that it is not attached to any specific existence, not to the individuality common to
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existence as such, that it is not attached to life.”18 At the same time, self-consciousness needs
another self-consciousness for its satisfaction, and so the other must also be revealed as other to
self-consciousness, and not merely as an immediate natural object. These recognitive dilemmas
get resolved through self-consciousness and the other engaging in a “life-and-death struggle”;19
both side stakes its own life and seeks the death of the other. In the life-and-death struggle each
side asserts itself as the pure negative essence. In seeking the death of the other each reveals itself
as the negative power that can take away the world of the other, and in staking life each reveals
itself as the essence that transcends all of its outward appearances. It is here that Hegelian freedom
makes it first appearance, though in crude form, as the abstract essence of self-consciousness that
at once exists apart from the natural predicates of the human person, but that makes itself actual in
actions that extend beyond natural, appetitive purposes. The staking of life is therefore, for Hegel,
the primary threshold that one must pass through in becoming free:
It is only through the staking of one’s life that freedom is won; only thus is it proved
that for self-consciousness, its essential being is not just being, not the immediate
form in which it appears, not its submergence in the expanse of life, but rather that
there is nothing present in it which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment,
that it is only being-for-self. The individual who has not risked his life may well be
recognized as a person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an
independent self-consciousness.20
In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History Hegel characterizes history as “the slaughter-bench
at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals have been
sacrificed.” 21 It is appropriate, then, that in Hegel’s parable history commences in violence.
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Humanity lifts itself out of Nature – that which has no history – in negating what is natural in
humanity, i.e., the body with its desires, and such negation in its most immediate form is violence.
It cannot be violence for the sake of needed resources, however, but rather pure destructive
violence directed against the other qua other, in which self-consciousness is recognized as being
irreducible to any specific content.
This sort of pure, immediate violence nevertheless fails to satisfy self-consciousness for a
simple reason: its consummation makes recognition impossible. Just as the immediate
consciousness lost its object as soon as it had it, the life-and-death struggle would destroy at least
one side of self-conscious movement that the life-and-death struggle itself seeks to complete.
Through this experience “self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure selfconsciousness,” 22 which has the significance that, for Hegel, actuality is just as important for
freedom as is the abstract essence, and that freedom is in fact one with its actuality. Thus selfconsciousness abandons the immediate violence of the life-and-death struggle and adopts instead
a mediate form of violence, one that maintains the other in a state of becoming-negated. Here
emerges the shape of Lordship and Bondage, in which the two self-consciousnesses assume the
asymmetric relation in which “one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to
be for itself, [and] the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live
or to be for another.”23 Such asymmetry reflects the unintegrated duality that has emerged in the
dialectic of recognition between abstract freedom and actual freedom; at this stage the lord takes
all of abstract freedom onto itself and has the bondsman as the passive actuality of its freedom.

22
23

Hegel and Findlay, Phenomenology of Spirit, 115.
Hegel and Findlay, Phenomenology of Spirit, 115.

20
In the bondsman the lord has his recognition as absolutely free, while the lord recognizes
the bondsman as a mere thing. Their recognition is itself mediated by things. The lord relates to
the bondsman in the things that the lord makes the bondsman labour upon, and the bondsman
relates to the lord in the products of the labour. These products are the actuality of the lord’s selfcertainty; in them the lord apprehends his freedom objectified in the shape of thinghood: “the lord,
who has interposed the bondsman between it [the thing] and himself, takes to himself only the
dependent aspect of the thing and has the pure enjoyment of it. The aspect of its independence he
leaves to the bondsman, who works on it.”24 The bondsman, conversely, encounters the thing as
substance, and through his labour negates the substance of the thing so that it takes on the shape
of the lord’s subjectivity, e.g., for the bondsman the thing is an animal that must be raised and
processed, while for the lord the thing is meat that may be enjoyed or disposed of. Through this
process the lord’s freedom, his mastery over Nature, is made actual and reflected into the lord’s
self-consciousness in his enjoyment of the thing. The bondsman, on the other hand, relates to the
thing only in its independent substantiality, and therefore finds himself to be utterly mastered by
the thing – his freedom is without actuality and therefore without self-certainty. It seems, then, that
the lord has successfully attained the freedom and recognition he sought, and that therefore the
highest expression of freedom is domination viewed from the side of the dominator.
As we might expect, domination nevertheless proves to have its drawbacks. The impetus
for the Lordship and Bondage relation was recognition but “the outcome is a recognition that is
one-sided and unequal.”25 In other words, the reciprocity that characterized the previous shapes of
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self-consciousness have been lost. The lord has indeed asserted himself as absolutely free before
the bondsman, but in that very act he has undermined the possibility of recognition as such:

In this recognition the unessential consciousness is for the lord the object, which
constitutes the truth of his certainty of himself … What now really confronts him
is not an independent consciousness, but a dependent one. He is, therefore, not
certain of being-for-self as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality
the unessential consciousness and its unessential action.26

By placing the bondsman so far below himself, the lord makes the bondsman, to put it crudely,
one whose opinion counts for nothing. The bondsman is reduced to a thing for the lord, and a thing
cannot, as we saw earlier, satisfy self-consciousness’s need for recognition. The lord’s relation to
the world thus regresses to the empty transitoriness of the appetitive consciousness. The world
again takes on the shape of inert objects, which succumb immediately to the negativity of
consciousness. The lord “has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby its
unalloyed feeling of self, but that is the reason why this satisfaction is itself only a fleeting one,
for it lacks the side of objectivity and permanence.”27 Through dominating the other, the lord has
in fact denied himself access to the other, and so experience returns to its pre-other state of
repetition. We see, then, that in degrading the other we ultimately degrade ourselves rather than
elevate ourselves. “I am only truly free when the other is also free and is recognized by me as
free.”28
Just as the lord’s self-consciousness reverses itself, so too does that of the bondsman.
Unlike the lord, who has a mere thing for its other and thus loses the moment of recognition, the
bondsman has the absolute negativity of the lord as its other. “Hence the truth for [the bondsman]
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is the independent consciousness that is for itself.”29 Being thus recognized, the bondsman does
not regress into an appetitive consciousness, but rather attains self-certainty. The recognition of
the lord reaches the bondsman in the shape of the threat of death. This threat is not directed towards
any specific or natural content of the bondsman, but rather the bondsman’s abstract selfconsciousness itself. Labouring under the fear of death, the bondsman then subordinates his
appetitive nature to the will of the lord, in order to preserve himself as an abstract selfconsciousness. The bondsman’s self-certainty also has its side in actuality. In appetitive
consumption, the lord lost his object as soon as he had it, but “work, on the other hand, is desire
held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing.” 30 In
working on the thing, the bondsman finds himself objectified in the product of his labour. The
product objectifies and concretizes the bondsman qua abstract self-consciousness, because in
working on the thing the bondsman put up with the harsh conditions that afflicted his natural being
in order to preserve himself as an abstract self-consciousness. These two moments, the fear of
death and the forming of the product, are equally essential for the development of the bondsman’s
self-consciousness:

The two moments of fear and service as such, as also that of the formative activity,
are necessary, both being at the same time in a universal mode … Without the
formative activity, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not
become explicitly for itself. If consciousness fashions the thing without that initial
absolute fear, it is only an empty self-centered attitude; for its form or negativity is
not negativity per se, and therefore its formative activity cannot give it a
consciousness of itself as essential being.31
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Through an ironic, dialectical twist, then, it is the bondsman that attains self-conscious, that
recognizes itself as free, i.e., as a being that transcends its natural condition. This does not mean
that Hegel thinks slavery is right or emancipatory. Quite the opposite – Hegel thought, for instance,
that classical Greek and Roman society were inferior to modern society because of their practice
of slavery.32 Instead, Hegel is showing that one need not resort to the dubious practice of positing
and ought in place of an is when critiquing slavery because an immanent critique of slavery is
already inscribed within the recognitive structure of slavery itself: in subjugating the slave the
slave is recognized as in-itself free. Hegel is also making an argument that societies based on
slavery are inherently unstable because the slaves are bound to become self-conscious of their
freedom, and “that is why bloody wars developed in which slaves tried to free themselves, to obtain
recognition of their eternal human rights.”33 The bondsman’s self-consciousness at the end of the
Lordship and Bondage dialectic is highly abstract and lacking actuality, and thus it is in need of
determination and actualization, but it marks the first genuine appearance of self-consciousness in
the Phenomenology and, according to Hegel, on the stage of history. Hegel says in the Philosophy
of Spirit that “this subjugation of the slave’s egotism forms the beginning of true human freedom
… Slavery and tyranny are, therefore, a necessary stage in the history of nations.”34 Hegel then
thinks that absolute violence and bondage are necessary antecedents to the appearance of genuine
freedom in history. Hegel’s view is shocking in one sense, but in another, it is well known that
freedom is not free.
A number of important conclusions follow from the Lordship and Bondage parable, but
one in particular is crucial for our purposes: Hegel’s conception of the two-fold nature of freedom.
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On the one hand, freedom is, for Hegel, the abstract ‘I’, but on the other hand freedom must be
made actual, and these two sides are immediately and inextricably tied to each other in their mutual
development. The first side, the abstract ‘I’, is what has been called the Ātman, cogito,
transcendental apperception, etc. Its freedom consists in its transcendence of any determinate
content, as its nature is to collapse the manifold multiplicity of experience into a pure, negative
unity. For Hegel, it is the abstract ‘I’ that grounds the human capacity for freedom because through
it the human “stands above its content, i.e., its various drives, and also the further individual ways
in which these are actualized and satisfied.”35 As the Katha Upanishad puts it, “As the one fire,
after it has entered the world, though one, takes different forms according to whatever it burns, so
does the internal Ātman of all living beings, though one, take a form according to whatever He
enters and is outside all forms.”36 This vedic passage indicates both the freedom and the impotence
of the abstract ‘I’. In its negative unity, the ‘I’ maintains itself over and against the content, but at
the same time it remains wholly indeterminate. In its indeterminacy the ‘I’ is only a passive
medium that the content traverses; its negativity is in the shape of the appetitive consciousness in
its indeterminate, repetitive negativity, rather than that of the bondsman, whose negation is
determinate and thus gives the content a new, subsisting form. In this sense the abstract ‘I’ is
originally entirely beholden to the content: “since it is formally finite, it is tied to this content as to
the determinations of its nature and of its external actuality.” 37 Hegel therefore argues that the
human is not free insofar as it is the abstract ‘I’, but only that it thereby has the capacity or
potentiality for freedom. To the abstract unity of the ‘I’, Hegel says, “determinism rightly opposed
the content, which, as something encountered, is not contained in [the ‘I’] and therefore comes
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from outside.”38 The abstract ‘I’ therefore needs to be made objective and determinate in the field
of actuality for it to give rise to genuine freedom.
The abstract ‘I’ is always already made actual and determinate in the shape of the other.
Insofar as I recognize the other as self-conscious, the abstract ‘I’ is brought before me as object.
As the Lordship and Bondage dialectic seeks to show, such recognition radically reorders the
contours of reality that my actions and desires move across. My abstract ‘I’ is simultaneously
determined as the other of the other and it ceases to be the negative mediator of reality as such. It
is re-posited as the ‘I’ of this particular individual. Only then does the abstract person, as the
person who is actual yet exceeds all of its predicates, exist at all. Crucially, for Hegel, such an
abstract person can exist only in community with other abstract persons, even when it is a hostile
community like that of Lordship and Bondage. It is in a community, not in an individual per se,
that self-consciousness prevails. The collective behaviors that are characteristic of a given
community are the actuality of the recognition that determines the self-consciousness of that
community. It is in participating in these behaviors that the individual actualizes the abstract
person, since these behaviors do not pertain to the natural order of humanity but rather to Spirit,
or the self-conscious order of humanity. 39 Spirit is made unstable when the abstract truth and
actuality contradict one another – as in the case of the bondsman who is self-conscious of his
freedom but finds himself in bondage – thereby leaving the collective desires unsatisfied. That
dissatisfaction compels humanity to develop itself and to create history, which is itself an
expression of freedom insofar as in it Spirit develops without natural humanity developing. In
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history actuality is transformed, and through it and with it the self-consciousness of the abstract ‘I’
receives new determinations. Thus the two, the abstract ‘I’ and actuality, continually develop and
overstep each other and dance around their implicite unity. This process is the dialectic of history,
and it can only come to a rest when the abstract ‘I’ and its actuality come into perfect accordance
with one another. That would constitute the ultimate expression of freedom.
What exactly such a final shape of freedom would look like for Hegel will concern the rest
of our discussion, but for now we can make some preliminary remarks. In the introduction to his
Elements of the Philosophy of Right Hegel discusses the general features of his conception of
Freedom and there says, “the will in its truth is such that what it wills, i.e., its content, is identical
with the will itself, so that freedom wills freedom.”40 This has a twofold significance. On the one
hand it means that the free individual is one who fights for recognition both for itself and for others
– the latter being, due to the nature of recognition, a necessary concomitant to the former –
especially when this is at the expense of the individual’s natural being. Thus Hegel says, “those
who remains slaves suffer no absolute injustice; for he who has not the courage to risk his life to
win freedom, that man deserves to be a slave”41 What this provocative statement means is that the
slave who allows its right to recognition to be subordinated to its natural being is not in-itself free;
it is only a particularly wretched shape of appetitive consciousness. On the other hand “freedom
wills freedom” means that in the final shape of freedom people will live according to freedom
alone, and in so doing will spontaneously reproduce the conditions of their freedom in all of their
actions. A common thread through all of this is the negation of Nature. In freedom, humanity
overcomes its animalic dimension and our actions abandon the linear, repetitive logic of natural
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development to assume the dialectical, historical logic of Spirit. This is how Hegel argues for the
possibility of ethics, i.e., a canon of behaviors that are carried out on the basis of something other
than self-interested pleasure, as freedom is posited by him as the very force that overcomes the
part of ourselves that acts only on the basis of pleasure. In what follows we will see how this brings
Hegel’s conception of freedom very close to that of Immanuel Kant, who also saw freedom as
humanity’s overcoming of Nature

28
Chapter 2: Critique of Kant and Freedom as Reconciliation

Like his fellow German Idealists, Hegel wrote much of his philosophy with one goal in
mind: to overcome Immanuel Kant. For Hegel, Kant had brought about a revolution in thought
that was the German counterpart to the political revolution in France. Hegel saw both of these
revolutions as grand and seminal cataclysms in the history of Spirit. They constituted, so he
thought, the moment when the contradictory forces of the Enlightenment finally erupted, allowing
new dimensions of thought and freedom to open up and enter into history. Despite his reverence
for Kant and the French Revolution, Hegel also thought that they were both deeply, disastrously
flawed. Just as the Reign of Terror came about due to the flaws in the French revolutionary project,
Hegel thought that there were forces in Kant’s philosophy that could reap disastrous consequences
such as skepticism, nihilism, radical alienation – what Nietzsche would later name the ‘Death of
God’. Hegel saw it as the task of his philosophical generation to carry out a determinate negation
of Kant, that is, to take the Kantian premises and follow them out even further than Kant did, as to
allow their contradictions to bloom and for a new shape of philosophy to appear. Hegel thought
that other German philosophers, especially Fichte and Schelling, had already carried out much of
this project, but that the final steps remained to be taken. In this way Hegel saw himself as the
Napoleon of philosophy, with his task to save what was good in the revolution from the revolution
itself.
Although Hegel’s critique of Kant is often thought of as being primarily epistemological
and metaphysical, Hegel took Kant’s practical philosophy just as seriously. For Hegel, the
Absolute is the “identity of the theoretical and the practical” (SL, 824) – itself a Kantian distinction
– so that one cannot be considered complete until it is made to harmonize with the other. Thus
Hegel dedicates four lengthy subsections of the Phenomenology of Spirit to his confrontation with
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Kant’s practical philosophy. The confrontation reaches its peak in the first two subsections of the
Morality section of the Phenomenology, titled ‘The moral view of the world’ and ‘Dissemblance
and duplicity’. It is out of these two subsections that Hegel developments the final subsection of
Morality, ‘Conscience. The beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness,’ in which Hegel gives us his
theory of freedom as reconciliation. It is therefore necessary to look at Hegel’s critique of Kant’s
practical philosophy, both because the critique of Kant is central to Hegel’s philosophy generally,
and because the final conception of freedom that Hegel gives us in the Phenomenology,
reconciliation, is a determinate negation of Kant’s conception of freedom.
Before delving into Hegel’s critique of Kant’s practical philosophy we should first give a
brief exposition of Kant’s practical philosophy itself, with reference to the concept of freedom
contained therein. It begins with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Before and after Kant there has
been a great deal of debate over the possibility of human freedom in reference to two seemingly
conflicting facts: we appear to be physical bodies that are wholly subject to the laws of nature,
while at the same time we have a powerful inner sense of being free. In the Critique of Pure Reason
Kant draws the boundary of our understanding so that the resolution to such a debate lies outside
the field of the cognizable. He there argues that the human mind is of a definite structure, and one
which only allows for certain kinds of objects to be cognized, such as those that exist in space and
time and obey causality, etc. Everything else, that is, everything that cannot be cognized, belongs
to the things-in-themselves. There is much debate over what exact nature Kant means to ascribe to
things-in-themselves, but two things, among others, are certain: things-in-themselves cannot be
cognized, and whatever we would need to know to determine whether humans are free or not lies
within the thing-in-themselves. Therefore, Kant concludes, we simply cannot know whether
human freedom is possible.

30
And yet Kant emphatically affirms the existence of human freedom. In the Critique of
Practical Reason, written after the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says that the structures of the
mind analyzed in the previous critique were those of our theoretical faculty, i.e., the means through
which we produce natural science, mathematics, metaphysics, etc. In the Critique of Practical
Reason, however, Kant tells us that he is analyzing the structures of our practical faculty, i.e., the
means through which we make rational decisions. Kant claims that these two faculties are, in fact,
“one and the same reason,”42 but their supposed identity is quite obscure. That aside, Kant’s claim
is that theoretical reason is silent on the possibility of human freedom, while the possibility of
human freedom is the fundamental postulate of practical reason, since we can only make rational
decisions on that assumption. Thus Kant claims that we can assume the possibility of human
freedom for practical purposes without contradicting or infringing on our theoretical reason. In
order to not corrupt theoretical reason with the postulate of freedom, or any other postulate that
practical but not theoretical reason might contain, we simply must not bring it to bear on any
question concerning natural science, mathematics, metaphysics, etc. Those domains are regulated
by natural, spatial and temporal laws that theoretical reason seeks to cognize, and under the
jurisdiction of such laws there is no room for human freedom. Thus Kant locates human freedom
within the open domain of things-in-themselves.
The freedom that Kant ascribes to the human will is not that of capriciousness. It is not
simply insofar as a human wills an act that the act is free for Kant. A decision can only be free
under Kant’s definition if it has its origin purely in the practical use of reason and not in anything
that is subject to natural laws. For instance, a person who decides to eat because he or she is hungry
is not free because the stomach and the body as a whole are empirical objects and therefore subject
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to natural law. Such an action, and all actions of that sort, which are motivated by appetites or
emotions, are caught up within the causal nexus of nature and therefore are not free. This is not to
say that Kant thinks we are never free when we do anything that pertains to our appetites or
emotions, but rather that we are never free when we do anything because of our appetites or
emotions; the same action may be free or unfree according to whether it was carried out on the
basis of pure practical reason or not.
Kant must then show what the nature of pure practical reason is and how it can be that
practical reason allows us to make decisions without basing them on appetites or emotions. Kant
says that in order for practical reason to give us a determinate basis for making decisions that is
wholly distinct from appetites or emotions, which are determined according to natural law,
practical reason must have laws of it own. Thus Kant writes in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics
of Morals,
A rational being … has two standpoints from which he can regard himself and know
laws of the use of his powers and hence of all of his actions: first, insofar as he
belongs to the world of sense subject to laws of nature; second, insofar as he belongs
to the intelligible world subject to laws which, independent of nature, are not
empirical but are founded only on reason.43

This language of belonging to an intelligible world reflects some of the odd Platonic sentiments
Kant holds in regards to practical reason. For simplicity’s sake, we can take “insofar as he belongs
to the intelligible world” to mean “insofar as he possesses and utilizes his practical reason.” Kant’s
point is that just as Nature has laws that it must obey, e.g., Newtonian mechanics, and that nature
is nature insofar as it obeys such laws, so too practical reason has laws that it obeys and practical
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reason is practical reason just insofar as it obeys such laws. The former Kant calls “laws of nature,”
the latter “laws of freedom.”44
The paradigm case for laws of nature in Kant’s time was, as mentioned about, Newtonian
mechanics. In Newtonian mechanics, as in physics today, a minimal number of fundamental and
universal laws, e.g., universal gravitation, inertia, etc., are posited through which particular events
are derived or explained. According to Kant practical reason has only one fundamental and
universal law, which he therefore calls the moral law, and he expresses it in the form of his famous
Categorical Imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will
that it should become universal law.” 45 Kant puts the Categorical Imperative in various
formulations but the one given above is the most famous one and the most conducive to our
purposes; regardless, Kant insists that all of his formulations of the Categorical Imperative are
logically equivalent. The meaning and implications of the Categorical Imperative are of course
subject to debate, but this debate will be bracketed for our present purposes. The mainstream
interpretation of the Categorical Imperative is that is says that in order for an action to be moral it
must be capable of universal iteration. We can see this in the example of lying versus truth-telling:
while one can achieve certain ends by means of lying, if everyone were to only lie all of the time,
i.e., if the act of lying were universally iterated, then the act of lying would lose its efficacy because
its efficacy is derived from the expectation that at least some people tell the truth at least some of
the time – therefore lying is immoral. Conversely, if everyone were to only tell the truth all of time
the act of truth-telling would not be undermined to any degree – therefore truth-telling is moral.
Murder is another case where if everyone were to murder all of the time the act of murdering would
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obviously be rendered impossible in the long run. It is a common error to think that the Categorical
Imperative is merely an abstruse formulation of the Golden Rule or ‘treat others the way you want
to be treated’. The content of ‘the way you want to be treated’ is often determined by appetites and
emotions, and therefore is subject to laws of nature and therefore does not accord with Kantian
freedom. By contrast the Categorical Imperative is, according to Kant, not subject at all to appetites
or emotions because it requires only that one employ one’s pure practical reason to determine if
an action is universally iterable and thereby determine if it is moral. For Kant, then, one is free
insofar as one obeys the Categorical Imperative and thereby raises oneself above the influence of
natural law.
Kant’s practical philosophy seems to satisfy the concerns raised about freedom in our
preface and in the Lordship and Bondage dialectic. The conception of freedom contained in Kant’s
practical philosophy is not derivative of happiness or religion or an appeal to authority, and it
provides humanity with a determinate means for carrying the content of their actions beyond the
confines of our natural being. Also, if everyone were to obey the Categorical Imperative at all
times, we could expect that this would create a social condition characterized by perfect mutual
recognition. Kant himself thought this and he called such a social condition the “kingdom of
ends.” 46 Finally, Kant’s conception of freedom is systematically contained within the highly
sophisticated metaphysics and epistemology of his three Critiques, which makes it all the more
philosophically satisfying.
Enter Hegel. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History Hegel claims that “history is the
exhibition of Spirit striving to attain knowledge of its own nature,”47 that is, of its freedom. Kant’s
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conception of freedom is presented in the Phenomenology as being the result of the development
of Spirit’s self-consciousness that arose out of the French Revolution. Through the French
Revolution, Hegel claims, Spirit discovered a dimension to its freedom that was like Kant’s
conception of freedom in being divorced from appetite and emotion and oriented towards the
absolutely universal. This was, supposedly, as a necessary presupposition for the occurence of the
French Revolution, since it is a law of dialectical development that “what appears as sequel and
derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by.”48 The dialectical nature
of this development also means, for Hegel, that the new stage of Spirit reached in Kantian
philosophy must itself be sublated as was the French Revolution. Thus Hegel sets about critiquing
Kant’s practical philosophy. It being the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel uses his
phenomenological method of critique. He asks the reader to imagine the perspective, or the selfconsciousness, of the sort of moral agent Kant describes in his practical philosophy. It from the
inside of this self-consciousness that Hegel then draws out the contradictions of Kant’s practical
philosophy.
The name Hegel uses for the consciousness that sees itself and the world in terms of
Kantian practical philosophy varies between ‘the moral view of the world’, ‘moral consciousness’,
‘moral self-consciousness’ and the like, but for our purposes we will call it moral consciousness.
The central dilemma that Hegel sees as facing the moral consciousness is this: for the moral
consciousness nature, with its laws, is formally incommensurable with freedom, with its laws, and
yet nature is the domain in which freedom must be realized. Hegel points out that Kant establishes
the freedom of practical reason on the basis of an ontology that determines nature and practical
reason as wholly separate though coincident orders of existence. In other words, Kant’s practical
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reason is not free because it subdues or commands nature, but merely because it is indifferent to
nature. The relation between nature and practical reason is therefore symmetrical; each is equally
endowed with “the freedom of mere being,”49 meaning that they are both ‘free’ by virtue of both
being ontologically self-grounding. Thus Hegel says,

The freer self-consciousness becomes, the freer also is the negative object of its
consciousness. The object has thus become a complete world within itself … a
Nature whose laws like its actions belong to itself as a being which is indifferent to
moral self-consciousness, just as the latter is indifferent to it.50

Yet while the moral consciousness (or Kant) bases its freedom on this indifference, it nonetheless
insists that practical reason reach across the ontological divide and influence the course of nature.
This ontological divide is that which grounds the freedom of practical reason, yet the essence of
practical reason is posited as being the negation of this divide. Such is the dilemma of the moral
consciousness. Hegel draws a number of contradictions out of this dilemma in order to show that
Kant’s practical philosophy not only makes freedom and morality impossible, but in fact ends up
as a crude, metaphysically extravagant philosophy of hedonism.
The first contradiction that follows from the dilemma of the moral consciousness is that its
happiness is incommensurable with its freedom, yet the demands of practical reason includes a
demand for happiness. The incommensurability of happiness with freedom comes about because
happiness pertains to the moral consciousness as an empirical entity, that is, insofar as it is a body
in a historical moment. Thus happiness falls on the side of nature in the nature/practical reason
antithesis. That happiness is natural does not mean that it is impossible for happiness to come about
through the obeying of the moral law, but rather that such coming about is always an accidental
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and never a necessary occurrence. It is rather the case that “nature is not concerned with giving the
moral consciousness a sense of the unity of its reality with that of nature, and hence nature perhaps
may let it become happy, or perhaps may not”.51 Therefore the moral consciousness cannot derive
a universal law concerning happiness that conforms to the standard of the Categorical Imperative,
i.e., universal iterability. Kant himself asserts this in the Critique of Practical Reason:

Where each has to put his happiness comes down to the particular feeling of
pleasure and displeasure in each and, even within one and the same subject, to needs
that differ as this feeling changes; and a law that is subjectively necessary (as a law
of nature) is thus objectively a very contingent practical principle, which can and
must be very different in different subjects, and hence can never yield a law
because, in the desire for happiness, it is not the form of lawfulness that counts but
simply the matter, namely whether I am to expect satisfaction from following the
law, and how much.52

For the moral consciousness, happiness in any form, be it its own happiness or the happiness of all
or the greatest number, cannot issue necessarily from its moral action, because that would
introduce empirical contingency into its moral deliberation, and thus happiness in any form cannot
necessarily be an expression of its freedom. The occurrence of happiness is then a matter of
indifference to the moral consciousness insofar as it is free, and so happiness is left up to chance.
And yet, “the moral consciousness cannot forego happiness and leave this element out of
its absolute purpose”.53 Even the most common moral sense recognizes that a morality that leaves
happiness up to chance can hardly be viewed as adequate. Hegel’s reasons for why the moral
consciousness must make a duty out of happiness are rather obscure: “this element [happiness] in
the objectified purpose, in the fulfilled duty, is the individual consciousness that beholds itself as
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realized; in other words, it is enjoyment, which is thus implied in the Notion of morality”. 54
Fortunately, we need not spend too much effort discerning what Hegel means by this because Kant
agrees that the realization of happiness is an absolute duty of practical reason:

Concerning meritorious duty to others, the natural end that all men have is their
own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist if nobody contributed to the
happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally impair their happiness. But
this, after all, would harmonize only negatively and not positively with humanity
as and end in itself, if everyone does not strive, as much as he can, to further the
ends of others.55

Happiness, both for self and others, is therefore a duty that the moral consciousness must realize
if it is to be free. It is such an important duty, in fact, that Kant determines its realization as the
summum bonum, or highest good, not only of the moral consciousness but of the universe. Kant
opens the first section of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals by saying that, “there is
no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it which can be regarded
as good without qualification, except a good will,”56 meaning that a good will, i.e., adherence to
the moral law, is the only unconditioned good of the moral consciousness; but that it is the only
unconditioned good does not imply that it is the highest good. Rather, “to need happiness, and to
be worthy of it, and yet not to participate in it cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a
rational being,” and thus, “virtue and happiness together constitute possession of the summum
bonum in a person, and happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a
person and his worthiness to be happy) constitute the summum bonum of a possible world.”57 The
highest good, the ultimate aim, of the moral consciousness is to attain happiness as grounded in its
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moral action, that is, happiness as necessarily following from its moral action. This was shown in
the preceding to be impossible, and so the moral consciousness has in its very essence a
contradiction of practical reason.
Another contradiction follows from the dilemma of the moral consciousness. The moral
consciousness derives its freedom from its practical reason, expressed in the Categorical
Imperative as “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it
should become universal law,” because practical reason is indifferent to nature, but when the moral
consciousness evaluates the maxims that it is to act by it cannot help but introduce sensuous, and
thereby natural, elements into its deliberations. Kantian freedom is abstract and universal, but the
moral consciousness faces an injunction within the essence of its freedom to bring its abstract
universality into unity with nature through its action. Therefore its sensuousness cannot be done
away with or ignored because “sensuousness is itself a moment of the process producing unity,
viz. the moment of actuality.”58 Sensuousness brings the contingency and particularity of natural
activity into the morality of the moral consciousness, which thus puts anything, or any maxim, it
wills at odds with the strict universality of the Categorical Imperative. To put it in Hegelese:

The moral consciousness as the simple knowing and willing of pure duty is, in the
doing of it, brought into relation with the object [i.e. nature] which stands in contrast
to its simplicity, into relation with the actuality of the complex case, and thereby
has a complex relationship with it. Here arise, in relation to content, the many laws
generally, and in relation to form, the contradictory powers of the knowing
consciousness and of the non-conscious.59

This expresses the very essence of the Categorical Imperative, because the Categorical Imperative
is the formula for bringing the particularity of action into harmony with the universality of practical
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reason. There is a problem, however, which is that it is in principle impossible for any maxim to
attain to the universality demanded by the Categorical Imperative because all maxims, as maxims
of action, are related to sensuousness. In philosophical discourse it is possible to give deliberations
about the morality of lying the appearance of total abstraction, but in reality lying is always
something that is carried out by a body to another body or bodies through sensuous
communication, and lying is always about something and thereby, either directly or indirectly,
related to sensuousness (even lies about mathematical theorems are motivated at some level by
something sensuous).
From the above problem for the moral consciousness follows one of the most common
criticism of Kant’s practical philosophy: the Categorical Imperative leaves it undetermined as to
what level of generality a maxim must have in order to qualify as a universal law. The ambiguity
becomes problematic when one encounters cases of conflicting moral duties. The classic example
is the following: imagine that an innocent person is being hunted by a murderer and comes to your
house and hides in your basement; if the murderer were then to come to your door and ask you if
the innocent person were in your house, would it be better to lie and protect the innocent person
or to tell the truth and risk letting an innocent person be killed? Neither lying nor letting an innocent
person be killed can become a universal law. The moral consciousness could resolve this problem
by saying that in circumstances such as these it is moral to lie or moral to let an innocent person
die (Kant prefers the former). Whichever option is chosen, such a law would be general, but it is
unclear whether its generality meets the level universality demanded by the Categorical
Imperative. On the one hand it must, because otherwise an indefinite number of paradoxes of
similar form would inevitably beset practical reason, but on the hand it must not, because that
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would destroy the universality of the Categorical Imperative, which is the ground of its being in
its differentiation from nature.
This contradiction is especially problematic from Hegel’s perspective because he argues in
an earlier section of the Phenomenology that all ethical action requires a choice between conflicting
moral duties – thus he says, “innocence … is merely non-action, like the mere being of a stone,
not even that of a child”60 – and therefore cases of conflicting moral duties, which are those that
bring out this contradiction of practical reason, are the rule rather than the exception. The moral
consciousness is then constantly faced with this contradiction that the Categorical Imperative
demands that the moral consciousness violate the Categorical Imperative by acting according to
maxims that in principle cannot become universal laws. The alternative is to do nothing – which
might be the only action that is genuinely universally iterable, only that Kant makes it clear in the
Groundwork that “to preserve one’s life is a duty.” 61 Once again we see that the moral
consciousness has a contradiction in its essence, in that which is meant to ground its freedom.
The third major contradiction Hegel develops out of the dilemma of the moral
consciousness is the most fundamental. As said above, the freedom of the moral consciousness, or
rather the very existence of the moral consciousness, is grounded in the opposition of nature and
practical reason. At the same time, the demands of practical reason are absolute, uncompromising,
categorical. As Kant says in the Groundwork, it is not enough for the moral consciousness to
merely not violate the moral law, but rather it must positively embody the moral law to its ultimate
end. Thus the absolute duty of the moral consciousness, which is that which it must pursue if it is
to be free, is to bring nature into conformity with the moral law. This is, of course, an insane
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injunction, but it is one which follows from the premises of Kant’s practical philosophy, as Kant
readily admits. As quoted above, Kant says that his summum bonum is also the summum bonum
of “a possible world”. Kant in fact concludes his Critique of Judgment by arguing that the summum
bonum is the telos of the natural universe. Anyone will concede that it is practically (in the
colloquial sense) absurd to expect that nature can be made to conform to Kant’s moral law, but
this is not Hegel’s concern. Hegel’s concern is that even if such a task were practically possible
for the moral consciousness it would nonetheless remain ontologically impossible for the moral
consciousness. The task is ontologically impossible because the moral consciousness is, again,
constituted by the opposition between nature and practical reason, and so the removal of this
opposition would be the removal of the moral consciousness itself. Hegel says,
Consciousness has … to bring about this harmony [with nature] and continually to
be making progress in morality. But the consummation of this progress has to be
projected into a future infinitely remote; for if it actually came about, this would do
away with the moral consciousness. For morality is only moral consciousness as
negative essence, for whose pure duty sensuousness has only negative significance,
is only not in conformity with duty.62

The moral consciousness itself is defined in contradistinction to nature, and thus insofar as
something is in harmony with nature it cannot be the moral consciousness and vice versa. The
moral consciousness thereby guarantees its own failure in the demand it makes for itself, which is
its essence, that it bring nature into accord with freedom. It cannot, however, give up this demand
because then it gives up itself, and it cannot allow the realization of this demand because then it
likewise gives up itself. The moral consciousness therefore makes a compromise, to perpetually
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strive for the realization of its absolute duty without ever hoping to reach it. Such perpetual striving
is what Kant himself posits in the Critique of Practical Reason:
Complete conformity of the will with the moral law is … a perfection of which no
rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since
it is nevertheless required as practically necessary, it can only be found in an endless
progress toward that complete uniformity.63

This plea by the moral consciousness, that it be allowed to never realize the demand of its practical
reason so long as it promises to strive endlessly after it in utter futility, is pure duplicity for Hegel.
If the moral consciousness is to be truly moral then “its content has to be thought of as something
which simply must be, and must not remain a task.”64 In other words, the supposed purpose of
practical philosophy is to determine a means by which an ‘ought’ may be derived from an ‘is’, but
the practical reason of Kant and the moral consciousness produces an ought that is utterly impotent,
which in principle cannot be realized, and the moral consciousness disguises this failure in the
guise of an endless striving. There can not even be any question of advancing towards the
impossible goal in this case because “advancing as such … would assume quantitative difference
in morality; but there can be no question of these in it”65 at least not in a morality that operates
according to universal laws and categorical imperatives.
As the quotes from Kant show, Kant himself was well aware of all of these problems with
his practical philosophy, and he was the first to raise them. Kant nevertheless thought that he had
a solution to these problems: God. Kant takes all of these flaws in his theory not as evidence against
his theory but rather as evidence for the existence of God. Kant claims that God will give the moral
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consciousness infinite life through which to endlessly progress towards moral perfection, will
consecrate the particular laws of practical reason even if they do not otherwise conform to the
Categorical Imperative, and will reward the moral consciousness for its moral behavior, and thus
establish a necessary connection between freedom and happiness. Hegel thought this was
ludicrous. The moral consciousness has failed in every regard to meet the standards of morality
that it has set for itself, and yet it expects God to grant it immortality and happiness out of divine
grace:

It is aware of its imperfection and cannot, therefore, in point of fact demand
happiness as a desert, as something of which it is worthy. It can only ask for
happiness to be granted as a free act of grace, i.e. it can only ask for happiness as
such, as something existing in and for itself, and can expect it, not on the absolute
ground mentioned above [morality] but as coming by chance and caprice. Here,
then, non-morality declares just what it is – that it is concerned not about morality,
but solely about happiness as such without reference to morality.66 (PS, 379)

Kant has been called a puritan, a prude, a tyrant and even an idiot for his practical philosophy, but
Hegel went so far as to accuse him of being a hedonist. Hegel even makes the proto-Nietzschean
point that the only discernible function that the moral view of the world serves the moral
consciousness is to provide it with a basis for judging others, especially those who are happy, for
being immoral and therefore undeserving of happiness. Whether such was Kant’s intention in
writing his practical philosophy is of course impossible to determine, although in regards to
hedonism it is true that Kant left humanity instructions on how to throw a good party in his
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.67
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The moral consciousness collapses under its contradictions, but the dialectic of the
Phenomenology carries on. What follows is not a ‘synthesis’ of the moral consciousness with
whatever one might suppose its ‘antithesis’ to be, rather it is an uncovering of the presupposition
of the moral consciousness. The latter showed itself to be contradictory and thus incomplete, and
so it cannot be a self-subsistent system of thought but must instead be a botched abstraction of a
more fundamental, more expansive system of thought. We need our immanent critique of the moral
consciousness in order to identify the underlying system of thought; without this critique we would
not know what the moral consciousness truly is. What it is, at least for Hegel, is not the autonomous
rational agent pursuing the good of humanity as its ultimate end, but rather a consciousness that
judges itself to be good and deserving of happiness despite its not conforming to any universal
standard of goodness. At the same time, Kant claims that the moral consciousness is free insofar
as it obeys the dictates of its practical reason, but in making this claim Kant surreptitiously posits
a second, more fundamental freedom: the freedom of the moral consciousness to choose to
between obeying its practical reason and not obeying its practical reason. Such hidden properties
are in fact what grounds the moral consciousness and make possible its particular shape of selfconsciousness.
Hegel calls the shape of consciousness that follows the moral consciousness in the dialectic
of the Phenomenology ‘conscience’. Conscience does not reflect on its actions or its attitudes, but
instead embodies them immediately and without deliberation, and in so doing affirms its actions
and attitudes as moral: “It is a pure conscience which rejects with scorn such a moral ideal of the
world; it is in its own self the simple Spirit that, certain of itself, acts conscientiously regardless of
such ideas, and in this immediacy possesses its truth.” 68 Conscience is the anti-philosophical
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consciousness, the person who has no answer to Socrates’ questions and does not care. Its
convictions come to it likes its senses,69 i.e., with pure immediacy and certainty. Conscience is
therefore immersed in the particularity and fullness of content of its lifeworld in a way that the
moral consciousness was forced to spurn. Its actions are immediate in that there is no gap between
them and its convictions; its convictions are translated immediately into its actions such that its
convictions and its actions are in fact one and the same, only viewed according to different
modalities. It it thus absolutely free in itself and this freedom can only be limited or negated
through forces that are external to conscience.
At first sight, conscience can appear as an underdeveloped or naively optimistic shape of
Spirit for Hegel to put forward, since Hegel says that it acts morally without providing any schema
for how it arrives at its moral convictions. This gap is intentional, however, and through it Hegel
anticipates many of the critiques of morality that later appear in thinkers like Marx, Nietzsche and
Freud. The moral convictions of conscience are bodily and receive no mediation from thought: “It
determines from its own self; but the sphere of the self into which falls the determinateness as such
is the so-called sense-nature; to have a content taken from the immediate certainty of itself means
that it has nothing to draw on but sense-nature.”70Sense-nature pertains to the dark, animalistic
portion of the human soul for Hegel, meaning that it pertains to Hegel’s much-neglected
conception of the unconscious. Hegel’s claim is that moral convictions appear immediately to
conscience out of its unconscious, just as sense impressions appear to us without our awareness of
how they were created. It is not that every thought appears to conscience as moral, but rather that
some of its thoughts appear to it as already determined to be moral.
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The late placement of conscience in Hegel’s discussion of morality signifies that it is, in
addition to being a particular shape of Spirit, what ultimately grounds all the preceding shapes of
morality and ethical judgment presented in the Phenomenology, including hedonism,
utilitarianism, Kantianism, etc. Again, along Marx-Nietzsche-Freudian lines, Hegel is arguing that
all these moral systems, with their various degrees of elaborateness, are intellectual dressing for
moral convictions issuing from the unconscious. The particular shape of Spirit called conscience
is simply the first consciousness that is self-consciousness, that is, embodying, the true nature of
its morality; it is the truth of these ethical shapes that is raised to certainty. Hegel does not mean
to deprecate moral action in this way, or make it seem entirely arbitrary. As we saw above, not all
thoughts that enter conscience’s consciousness appear to it as moral, just as any person experiences
thoughts that he or she ethically disowns. Conscience is the righteous agent who only obeys the
thoughts that appear to it as moral.
Conscience, being a shape of self-consciousness, requires recognition. What conscience is,
and therefore what it puts forward for recognition, is not its outward, actual aspect, but rather the
pure form of its willing that immediately relates its actions to duty. The consequences of its actions
are not what counts, nor the specific content of its convictions and actions. So far as its duty is
concerned, all that counts is that its actions are one with its convictions. Thus conscience must
declare its convictions to others: “what is valid for that self-consciousness is not action as an
existence, but the conviction that it is a duty; and this is made actual in language.” 71 All that
conscience essentially does is declare its convictions, so that others will recognize that conscience
is acting out of its convictions rather than out of its non-moral thoughts and impulses. But although
conscience seeks the recognition of others, there is no necessary connection between its
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convictions and the convictions of others. Conscience has no universal law, no ethical criteria, and
no system of norms from which it draws its convictions, and so others are bound to view
conscience as capricious, selfish, etc. Conscience, however, cannot acknowledge the judgments of
others, good or bad, because that would violate the immediacy of its freedom. It must continue to
act as it naturally does while submitting itself to unsympathetic social judgment.
Thus conscience faces the tribunal of the universal consciousness. The universal
consciousness represents the interests of the community and of pure, unadulterated duty. From the
point of view of the universal consciousness, conscience is evil. Conscience wills only its
particular sensuous being; it makes no attempt to reconcile its actuality with that of others and in
fact must not make such an attempt. If conscience were to will anything other than its particular
sensuous being then it would cease to be conscience. Conscience is therefore in its very essence
opposed to the universal consciousness of others and thus, “when anyone says that he is acting
according to his own law and conscience against others, he is saying, in fact, that he is wronging
them.”72 The universal consciousness condemns conscience, as is its right, but conscience, again,
cannot acknowledge the criticism. It goes on declaring the righteousness of its convictions and
thereby preserves its being-for-self. The ultimate result is that the universal consciousness
recognizes conscience as both evil and hypocritical:

For the consciousness which holds firmly to duty, the first consciousness counts as
evil, because of the disparity between its inner being and the universal; and since,
at the same time, this first consciousness declares its action to be in conformity with
itself, to be duty and conscientiousness, it is held by the universal consciousness to
be hypocrisy.73
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Insofar as conscience is conscience it is only this hypocrisy. The being-for-self of conscience is its
recognition by the universal consciousness. The movement of its recognition is for conscience to
declare its conviction, which is only its particularity, to be universal, and the universal
consciousness recognizes this contradiction as such. At this stage of the dialectic, then, morality is
revealed to be nothing more than an empty, formal hypocrisy.
The nature of the universal consciousness remains undeveloped, however. So far it has
been defined merely as that which conscience appeals to for recognition, which is determined to
bear witness to the hypocrisy of conscience in its opposition to the so-called universal. However,
all formal criteria for morality, that is, the universality of an action, have already been lost at this
stage. There is no higher law for the universal consciousness to appeal to. It seemed at first to
represent the interests of the community, but the community has been reduced to an atomized heap
of consciences. The universal consciousness does not, therefore, represent any community per se
or any universal; it is merely another conscience. The judgment that it employs to judge the first
conscience therefore issues from a morality that is just as sensuous and particular as that of the
first conscience. It commits just as much of a sham in declaring the other to be a hypocrite as the
other does in declaring its conviction to be universal:

In denouncing hypocrisy as base, vile and so on, it is appealing in such judgment
to its own law, just as the evil consciousness appeals to its law. For the former
comes forward in opposition to the latter and thereby as a particular law. It has,
therefore, no superiority over the other law, rather it legitimizes it.74 (PS, 402)

The judging consciousness is immediately a hypocrite in denouncing the hypocrisy of the acting
consciousness. It nonetheless must carry out its judging. It is just as much conscience as the acting

74

Hegel and Findlay, Phenomenology of Spirit, 402.

49
consciousness, and so it derives its being-for-self from the recognition of its moral convictions.
Insofar as it is the recognizer, which is as essential to self-consciousness as being recognized, its
moral conviction is its judgment of the other. Its declaration succumbs to its particularity just like
that of the acting consciousness, and it reveals itself as the hypocrisy that claims to speak for the
universal. Thus the two consciousnesses reveal themselves as reciprocally opposed.
The opposition between practical reason and nature in Kant’s practical philosophy here
reappears as the opposition between the acting consciousness and the judging consciousness. In
the moral consciousness the opposition was present in one and the same individual: the moral
consciousness judged itself, as a natural, acting being, from the standpoint of its own practical
reason and always found itself wanting. In conscience the opposition is split between two
individuals. The split is significant for a number of reasons. First, it reintroduces recognition into
the movement of freedom. The moral consciousness failed in part because it lacked the moment
of recognition. Instead of seeking recognition from others it sought to produce self-recognition out
of its own resources by seeking out an absolute standpoint, one from which it could anticipate the
judgment of the universal Other – as Kant says in the Critique of Judgment: “(1) think for oneself;
(2) think from the standpoint of everyone else; and (3) think always consistently.”75 Thereby the
moral consciousness thought it could simulate the abstract form of recognition without risking
confrontation with actual others. Conscience, conversely, sees the failure of the supposedly
absolute standpoint. It therefore has no other option but to brave actual recognition in the social
field. What conscience wins in doing this, however, is the removal of the asymmetry that beset the
moral consciousness. In the moral consciousness its actual, natural being was always subordinated
to its abstract, rational being. In conscience, however, its tribunal is not before some ultimate
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authority but rather before another conscience, that is, another fragile, confused human being. The
opposition remains due to the indifferent particularity of each consciousness, in tandem with their
mutual requirement to recognize and be recognized by each other. However, for the first time since
the life-and-death struggle, the equality of self and other has come into view.
The equality of self and other prepares the way for the ultimate recognition that is
reconciliation. In the opposition of the two consciousnesses action and judgment collapse into one
another. The judgment, as action, is to convict the other of hypocrisy. The hypocrisy of the other
comes from its action, in which it judges the first consciousness for its hypocrisy. In this perfect
symmetry the moment of true recognition finally occurs in which each consciousness is able to
recognize the judgment of the other. Such recognition occurs because each consciousness comes
to see itself in the other, that is, to see their symmetrical identity and interdependence. Thus the
movement of reconciliation can take place. The first moment of reconciliation is confession:

[The acting consciousness] does not merely find himself apprehended by the other
as something alien and disparate from it, but rather finds that other, according to its
own nature and disposition, identical with himself. Perceiving this identity and
giving utterance to it, he confesses this to the other, and equally expects that the
other, having in fact put himself on the same level, will also respond in words in
which he will give utterance to this identity with him, and expects that this mutual
recognition will now exist in fact.76

In a certain sense the charge of hypocrisy remains here, only its meaning is reversed because the
shape of Spirit in which it is embedded shifts around it. When the judging consciousness
hypocritically says, ‘you are a hypocrite,’ it is in effect saying, ‘you are like me’. In other words,
once both consciousnesses lose their claim to universality the charge ‘you are a hypocrite’ reveals
itself to mean ‘you are conscience’ and this is said as and by conscience. That is why “confession
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is not an abasement, a humiliation.”77 In confessing to hypocrisy conscience is in fact confessing
to being conscience, which is nothing else but the declaration of conviction that is the essence of
conscience. With both consciences making their confessions the second moment of reconciliation
also takes place: forgiveness. In forgiveness, like in confession, the charge of hypocrisy remains
but is sublated through its shifting context. ‘You are a hypocrite’ reveals itself as ‘you are
conscience’ and finally ‘you are me’. With this we have perfect recognition that is the reciprocal
codetermination of self-consciousness, which possesses both its truth and its certainty, and does
not need to go beyond itself. Thus we have at last the resolution of the Lordship and Bondage
dialectic and the emergence of the shape of Absolute Spirit:

The word of reconciliation is the objectively existent Spirit, which beholds the pure
knowledge of itself qua universal essence in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of
itself qua absolutely self-contained and exclusive individuality – a reciprocal
recognition which is absolute Spirit.78
Here the abstract ‘I’ appears in its absolute determinacy, which corresponds to the absolute
expression of freedom. The actuality of the absolute ‘I’ is here the word of recognition, meaning
the linguistic expression of reconciliation understood as an immanent phenomenon, since
“language is the existence of Spirit as an immediate self.”79 In freedom, then, self and other are
determined as being one and the same ‘I’ despite their outward differences, and this unity is made
actual in the language of reconciliation.
One might think, then, that Hegel’s conception of existent freedom is a naive, hyperChristian state of forgiveness, in which we forgive all others for every misdeed they might commit.
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However, reconciliation is not directed towards any particular act, but towards otherness as such.
Also, there are necessary developments that precede the moment of reconciliation. It is necessary,
above all, that each consciousness repents. Hegel is quite clear that “the stiff-necked unrepentant
character … cannot attain to an identity with the consciousness it has repulsed.”80 Therefore the
lord, the moral consciousness, or any other shape of self-consciousness that precedes the repentant
conscience cannot achieve reconciliation, regardless of whether or not it is forgiven by its other.
That is because the former shapes of self-consciousness still cling to their particularity in their selfcertainty. The lord is self-certain in his power over the bondsman and his consumption of the
bondsman’s labour; the moral consciousness is self-certain in its isolated contemplation of the
abstract moral law. Even the bondsman is self-conscious only in the things it forms through its
labour. What this does, ultimately, is cut self-consciousness off from its other when, as Hegel
argued in the Lordship and Bondage dialectic, the other is the truth of self-consciousness. The
abstract ‘I’ exists only in its reflection in the other; Hegelian self-consciousness is an
intersubjective phenomenon. In repentance, the individual determines the particularities of its
outward existence as unessential, and self-certainty is brought into communion with the abstract
‘I’. In forgiveness, the individual determines the particularities of the other’s outward existence as
unessential, and self-consciousness is brought into communion with the abstract ‘I’. These two
moments constitute the movement of reconciliation that liberates the self from its isolation.
It is crucial to note that the negation of outward existence, i.e., the determining of it as
unessential, is not a vilifying of it. Rather, it is in the medium of outward existence that the abstract
‘I’ becomes itself. The abstract ‘I’ is thus nothing other than the self-negation of outward existence.
This cannot be overstressed: a purely behaviorist reading of these passages is possible. In special
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sorts of interactions between people linguistic and social content is generated in which people
recognize and embody their abstract unity and equality with other people despite the countless
material differences between people, and these linguist and social content come to influence the
ways in which people interact with each other – that is Hegelian freedom. The phenomenological
aspect is certainly important to Hegel, but it is always inseparably linked to its manifestation in
concrete reality. Hegel’s language can obfuscate this, as it obfuscates many things, but Hegel’s
appropriation of terms from Christian theology and Greek ontology reflects the ecumenical role
Hegel that ascribes to himself in the history of thought rather than a commitment to the
metaphysical concepts that these terms traditionally signify. Hegel’s idealism proper becomes
relevant in his conception of the Absolute, but that is beyond the scope of our discussion here.
What is relevant here is to observe that in reconciliation the ‘I’ needs the outward content, which
is the form of otherness, to exist at all, since the ‘I’ is only the self-negation, or the immanent
negativity, of this content itself. The self-negation of nature in human behavior is Spirit, and in
reconciliation it is Absolute Spirit. In reconciliation the abstract ‘I’ as Spirit reclaims its status as
the negative essence of the world, since it no longer finds itself opposed by another negative
essence. Now the abstract ‘I’ is that which negates the natural differences of distinct individuals
and thereby posits their unity and encompasses their self-consciousness. Again, Hegel is not
positing anything transcendent. Absolute Spirit is the process by which bodies in a community
each say to one another, “despite the fact that I am over here and you are over there, we are one
and the same.”
When reading ethical philosophy we often seek some guidance in the author’s words for
how we ought to lead our own lives. Here, Hegel must disappoint. First of all, Hegel thinks that
the whole notion of an ‘ought’, as something which is absolute yet non-actual, is specious. Hegel’s
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philosophy is therefore not normative but rather descriptive. For Hegel, freedom is a historical
phenomenon that he simply wants to give an account of. Second of all, and this is some sense the
same as the first point, Hegel rejects the notion of individualistic morality. Morality is concerned
with how I relate myself to the other. As Hegel tries to demonstrate, I and other are only legible in
terms of one another. Therefore, for the I to deduce moral judgments in isolation and out of its
own resources, whether through a utilitarian or a Kantian schema, is misguided from the outset.
The isolated individual is always finite and subjective, so for it to make its own pronouncements
on morality, which concerns the infinite and objective, is the highest pretension. Therefore if one
were to extract a normative doctrine from the Phenomenology of Spirit, it would say that the
individual should simply follow its immediate conscience and reconcile itself to others when its
convictions come into conflict with those of others. That, however, would ultimately miss Hegel’s
point, which is that individuals cannot help but follow their consciences, and that all ‘rational
moralities’ are rather rationalizations of a morality that is always decided in advance by
unconscious processes. This does not mean that everything is permitted. Rather the opposite: every
individual bears absolute responsibility for his or her actions; there is no abstract schema to defer
to. Thus no one can say, like Eichmann, “I was only performing my duty.” Concomitantly,
however, individuals are not in a position to pass moral judgment on one another. For one
individual to judge another would necessitate that it employ a system of oughts and an
individualistic morality. Morally speaking, individuals are intrinsically equal in that no one, by
virtue his or her station or moral education, is in any better position than anyone else for making
moral judgments or decisions. Such moral equality, again, does not imply that every act is equally
justified, or that every act should be forgiven, but rather that morality is not the business of the
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individual qua individual. As we will see in what follows, it is up to social institutions to determine
the moral value of a given action.
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Chapter 3: Sittlichkeit, the State and Absolute Spirit

With the possible exception of his supposed obscurantism, charlatanry, hubris,
panglossianism, Christianity, atheism, pantheism, monism, relativism, absolutism or overall
weirdness no aspect of Hegel’s philosophy has received more derision than his supposed
totalitarianism. The charge that Hegel is totalitarian, be it valid or not, certainly has its origin in
interpretations of his philosophy of the state. In his book The Open Society and Its Enemies Karl
Popper identifies Hegel as one such ‘enemy’ on the basis of his state philosophy, to the point that
Popper accuses Hegel of bearing responsibility for both the far left and the far right totalitarianism
of the 20th Century. Likewise, Hegel’s name is rarely mentioned in Deleuze and Guattari’s twovolume Capitalism and Schizophrenia, but he is clearly the unnamed enemy lurking in the
background, as the purest embodiment of the philosopher-apologist for the ‘state apparatus’, in
contrast to the ‘nomadic’ thinking Deleuze and Guattari positively associate with themselves and
whatever past philosophers they happen to like (such as Nietzsche and Archimedes). It is surprising
that a thinker so obsessed with freedom, who argued so strongly against subjugation, would be
accused of totalitarianism, but the reason for this is to be found, quite unsurprisingly, in Hegel’s
writing style. Hegel makes a number aphoristic remarks in his later philosophy that, when removed
from their context, can easily arouse suspicions of totalitarianism. For example in his Lectures on
the Philosophy of History Hegel says that “the State is the divine Idea as it exists on earth” 81 and
“what counts is the common will; in thus being suppressed the individual will retires into itself,
and this is the first condition necessary for the existence of the universal.”82 There is no question
that Hegel is opposed to classical liberalism, but given the general complexity of Hegel’s thought,
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much care must be taken in assessing the supposed totalitarianism of his state philosophy,
particularly as it stands in relation to the regimes of the 20th Century.
Hegel’s most notorious statement comes in the preface to his Elements of the Philosophy
of Right, his major work of political philosophy, in which he says, “what is rational is actual, what
is actual is rational.”83 This statement has been interpreted by many otherwise intelligent thinkers,
such as Schopenhauer, Russell and, of course, Popper, to mean that Hegel is saying that whatever
the status quo happens to be, it must be rational and therefore justified. The actual/rational quote
is used repeatedly to characterize Hegel as an apologist of the Prussian state he was living under.
While it is true that one of the central projects of Hegelian philosophy is theodicy (Hegel himself
uses the word) in the style of Leibniz, this must be understood in a qualified sense. Hegel’s
rational/actual principle is to some extent simply a reversal of Aristotle’s position put forward in
the Metaphysics that accidental causes and predicates are not capable of being analyzed. To give
an example of this principle, take the relationship between manifest dream content and latent
dream content as presented in Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams. The manifest dream content
presents itself in the jumbled, surreal form we are all familiar with, in which meanings, memories
and images are squished together and stacked on top of each other according, seemingly, to pure
accident. The rational/actual principle tells us that because this overdetermined structure of the
dream content has no discernible logic to it, it must be epiphenomenal. This is exactly the position
that Freud takes, leading him to formulate his method of dream analysis for arriving at the latent
dream content, which has a special logic of its own and is therefore actual, i.e., the true structure
of the dream. To take a Hegelian example we have already discussed, relationships of subjugation
are non-actual according to the rational/actual principle. In the Lordship and Bondage relationship
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the lord’s self-consciousness, his immediate certainty that he is free and that he has total mastery
over the bondsman, is not rational: it is beset by contradiction and structural failure. Thus the truth
of the relationship, what is actual in it, is that the lord the is one who is unfree, although this has
not yet reached the certainty of Spirit. Therefore when it comes to social relations, which would
include whatever the status quo might be, the rational/actual principle is not a means of
justification, but it is rather the very means by which Hegel criticizes the state of affairs. The
meaning of this notorious statement is then anything but that might is right.
It is on the basis of the rational/actual principle that Hegel argues that the state is the most
rational of all of the social systems that have appeared across history, and therefore the most actual,
i.e., stable and self-determining. Hegel also thinks that among states there are more or less rational
ones, the most rational being his theoretical ideal state. Hegel’s ideal state is not one that has ever
existed on Earth. It is not, for instance, the Prussian state that Hegel himself lived under, which it
is often claimed to be by those who want to portray Hegel as an apologist for his beaurocrat
benefactors84. The exact significance of Hegel’s ideal state is difficult to determine. First of all,
the detailed description he gives of it in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right does not, again,
accord exactly with the constitution of any existing state. One might think, then, that Hegel is
proposing a perfect society that we should strive to bring into existence, as Plato is often thought
to be doing in the Republic. Hegel explicitly rejects this, however. He says in the preface to the
Philosophy of Right, “this treatise … must distance itself as far as possible from the obligation to
construct a state as it ought to be; such instruction as it may contain cannot be aimed at instructing
the state on how it ought to be, but rather at showing how the State, as the ethical universe, should
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be recognized.”85 The latter part of this statement is not very clarifying. One might take it to mean
that Hegel is presenting what he takes to be the State as such, that is, the telos that all contingent
states tend towards and have as their total actualization. However, Hegel also seems to preclude a
teleological reading with his famous remark towards the end of the preface to the Philosophy of
Right that “the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk,” 86 meaning that
philosophy is something that essentially comprehends the past, and thus has no instructions or
predictions for the future. If Hegel were claiming to have deduced the telos of all contingent states
then it is difficult to see how he could avoid committing himself to making predictions about the
future, at least of a general sort. To interpret the significance of Hegel’s ideal state is extremely
challenging and deserving of a treatment elsewhere since it will not receive one here. Rather, the
discussion here will mostly ignore Hegel’s ideal state and rather focus on Hegel’s concept of the
state as a species concept, that is, as a way that Hegel describes a special sort of social order that
appears repeatedly throughout the cycles of history. Nonetheless, for the purpose of not repressing
anything important, it should at least be mentioned that there are a number of bizarre and
embarrassing aspects to Hegel’s ideal State, such as its being a monarchy and having some sanction
over the press.87 In regards to these and other views of Hegel’s that would seem retrograde in our
political climate, we can only say, “as far as the individual is concerned, each individual is in any
case a child of his time; thus philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts.”88
If one thing can be said about the state as a historical species concept it is that Hegel thinks
that any society brings its potential for freedom into its fullest actualization when it assumes the
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form of a state. When Hegel says that “the State is the divine Idea as it exists on earth,” the “divine
Idea” he is referring to is freedom. Earlier in the Lectures Hegel says, “In contemplating world
history we must thus consider its ultimate purpose … hence, it is the Idea in general, in its
manifestations as human spirit which we have to contemplate. More precisely, it is the idea of
human freedom.” 89 Hegel, again, also tells us that “the essence of Spirit – its substance – is
Freedom,” and so “all the properties of Spirit exist only through Freedom.”90 The divine Idea is
then freedom and therefore Spirit considered abstractly. The state is then Spirit considered
concretely, or in actuality. Here it should also be noted that the appearance of the state in the
dialectic of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit and Philosophy of Right correspond closely with that of
reconciliation in the dialectic of the Phenomenology of Spirit. In the former two books appearance
of Ethical Life [Sittlichkeit], which culminates in the state, appears directly after conscience. The
conception of conscience in these books is roughly the same as that in the Phenomenology. In the
Philosophy of Spirit and Philosophy of Right a conflict emerges when one conscience is forced to
confront the conviction of another conscience, which is then resolved when the two are shown to
be formally indiscernible. However, in the Philosophy of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right this
resolution comes about simply by a direct transition into Ethical Life: “the standpoint of bare
reciprocity between the two independent sides – the standpoint of the ought, is abandoned, and we
have passed into the field of ethical life;”91 there is no moment of reconciliation. Hegel himself
points this out in the ‘Conscience’ section of the Philosophy of Right:

The extent to which ... certain other phenomena are related to the stage we are
considering [conscience] – these are questions which I have discussed in the
Phenomenology of Spirit. The whole of Section (c) of that work, ‘The Conscience’,
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should be compared with what is said here, especially in relation to the transition
to a higher stage in general (although the latter is defined differently in the
Phenomenology).92

When we compare what is said in the two books we find the determinate negation of conscience
passing into Absolute Spirit, or the highest manifestation of freedom, but this takes a different
form in each book: reconciliation in the Phenomenology and the state in the Philosophy of Right.
We are thus lead back to our original problem. However, it is helpful to revisit it in order to draw
out a further parallel that could not have been drawn out before, that freedom appears in both forms
as the determinate negation of conscience. The parallel role of conscience in reconciliation and the
state confirms that the presentation of the state as freedom in Hegel’s later philosophy is exactly
equivalent to the presentation of reconciliation as freedom in the Phenomenology. Their
equivalency, and its relation to conscience, cannot be further developed here until we have
described Hegel’s conception of the state as a historical species concept.
The state is the highest development of what Hegel calls Sittlichkeit and is usually
translated as ‘Ethical Life’. Sittlichkeit is the complex system of social customs, norms, beliefs
and practices that we all absorb and come to embody both consciously and unconsciously simply
by being immersed in it. It is not created by any one individual and in principle it cannot be so.
Instead, Sittlichkeit emerges spontaneously and continually through the interactions of selfinterested individuals. Again, Hegel does not believe in the state of nature, but Hegel does believe
in a transhistorical human nature: “In speaking of human nature we mean something permanent.
The concept of human nature must fit all men and all ages, past and present. This universal concept
may suffer infinite modifications; but actually the universal is one and the same essence in its most
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various modifications.”93 This human nature is selfish, animalistic, and above all appetitive. The
caveat, for Hegel, is that our appetites bring us into contact and conflict with other individuals.
When this occurs we are eventually forced to use our intelligence to communicate, negotiate and
compromise with one another. It is here that Spirit makes its initial appearance in History. Through
the continual processes of communication, negotiation and compromise within an interwoven
complex of individuals a Sittlichkeit is produced and maintained. In its coming to be Sittlichkeit
negates the animal drives that produce the it. The functioning of the drives is sublimated and
sublated into the aforementioned customs, norms, etc. that allow for their measured satisfaction
along with the existence of a relatively stable collective order. Hegel compares this rational
negation of natural being to the building of a house out of natural materials:

The building of a house is, in the first instance, a subjective aim and design. On the
other hand we have, as means, the several substances required for the work – iron,
wood, stones. The elements are used in preparing this material: fire to melt the iron,
wind to blow the fire, water to set wheels in motion in order to cut the wood, etc.
The result is that the wind, which has helped to build the house, is shut out by the
house; so also are the violence of rains and floods and the destructive powers of
fire, so far as the house is made fireproof. The stones and beams obey the law of
gravity and press downwards so that the high walls are kept up. Thus the elements
are made use of in accordance with their nature and cooperate for a product by
which they become constrained. In a similar way the passions of men satisfy
themselves; they develop themselves and their purposes in accordance with their
natural destination and produce the edifice of human society. Thus they fortify a
structure for law and order against themselves. Thus the passions are by no means
always opposed to morality but actualize the universal.”94 (LH, 35)

In the final sentence of the above passage Hegel brings together the gap between Nature and
freedom as posited by Kant and the moral consciousness. Sittlichkeit is an immanent system of
ethics that exists as an is and not merely an ought and is brought into existence by the spontaneous
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functioning of our natural being. Hegel nonetheless agrees with Kant that living according to one’s
natural impulse makes one unfree, and that living according to one’s reason makes one free.
Because our natural being is not of our own creation, when we blindly obey it we are subjecting
ourselves to an outside force. Conversely, when we obey our reason, with its infinite capacity for
abstraction, determination and creativity, then we live freely. This is the Kantian position. Where
Hegel disagrees with Kant is in rejecting the hard boundary Kant draws between Nature and
Reason. Hegel thinks that Nature and Reason, at least when it comes to humans, are inextricably
intertwined according to the scheme presented above. For Hegel, human nature is naturally selfnegating, and this self-negation is Reason, which belongs to the Spirit that structures the
Sittlichkeit.
The result is that, for Hegel, Reason is an inherently social phenomenon. Hegel thinks that
individuals are endowed with a faculty called the Understanding, which is more or less the Kantian
Understanding, i.e., a faculty of stable cognitive structures like the Categories, but that Reason, as
the faculty of dialectics that gives us access to the Absolute, only appears when a community of
persons engage in the process of coordinating their finite, subjective perspectives with one
another’s. 95 This is why Hegel uses the German word Geist. Geist can be translated either as
‘Spirit’ or as ‘Mind’. The double meaning of ‘Geist’ signifies how a community comprehends the
world, and functions as a kind of virtual subject, in a way that exceeds the comprehension of any
one person in that community, exceeding it not only quantitatively but qualitatively. Because
Sittlichkeit is produced by Geist, or Spirit, and not any individual within a community, each
individual within Sittlichkeit will find the structure of it beyond his or her comprehension:

95

Thus the dialectic of the Phenomenology passes from ‘The Understanding’ to ‘Self-Consciousness’.

64
If we consider ethical life from the objective point of view, we may say that ethical
man is unconscious of himself. In this sense, Antigone proclaims that no one knows
where the laws come from: they are eternal. That is, their determination has being
in and for itself and issues from the nature of the thing. But this substantial element
is also endowed with consciousness, although the status of the latter is only a
moment.96

A number of important points are contained within the above passage. The first is the one that we
have already outlined: that ethical practices, being a collective construction, exceeding the
understanding of any given individual. The second is that Hegel is not a social contract theorist.
The statement “their determination has being in and for itself…” is, in a sense, Hegel’s
idiosyncratic way of saying that he does not agree with social contract theory. For Hegel, an
individual is a product and an organ of his or her Sittlichkeit. The Sittlichkeit is a self-regenerating
substance, which loses and produces individuals without its essential form suffering in the least.
The individual is therefore an accident of the Sittlichkeit, not the cause of it. The individual is an
an accident of Sittlichkeit because, first, there is no state of nature, and therefore there has never
been an individual that has existed outside of society because, second, an individual is only an
individual insofar as it is a self-consciousness, and self-consciousness only exists through the
recognition of another self-consciousness. An individual, insofar as it is anything more than an
abstract vessel of drives, is determined by its Sittlichkeit. Thus Hegel says that, “although it is true
that all great men have formed themselves in solitude, they have done so only by assimilating what
the state has already created.” 97 By contrast, social contract theory beings with preformed
individuals who are self-conscious of their natural rights and who come together and create a
society through their conscious volition. Social contract theory is thus wrong for Hegel because it
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posits the individuals as the substance of the society, and because it presupposes that individuals
are capable of comprehending the society that they are contractually agreeing to be a part of. The
third point from the above passage comes from the final sentence where Hegel says that, “this
substantial element [Sittlichkeit] is also endowed with consciousness, although the status of the
latter is only a moment”. The consciousness that Sittlichkeit is endowed with is simply the
consciousness of each individual that lives within it. Consciousness is only a moment of
Sittlichkeit because, again, it is not the consciousness of any particular individual that is essential
to Sittlichkeit, but only the presence of conscious individuals as such, in the same way that the
matter in an organism’s cells is only a moment of its substance. Nonetheless, such consciousness
is essential, and it is conscience. As we saw in the previous chapter, the convictions of conscience
arrive from its unconscious. This unconsciousness is accounted for by the fact that “ethical man is
unconscious of himself.” Therefore the convictions of conscience have their origin in Sittlichkeit,
which is to say no more than the obvious point that we pick up our moral convictions from our
families teachers, friends etc. without first determining whether or not they are rational. The
conflicting convictions of different consciences within Sittlichkeit then manifest the contradictory
forces of Sittlichkeit itself, which are still in the process of developing towards a higher unity.
Thus the passage from conscience to Ethical Life in the Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of
Right.
Hegel breaks up Sittlichkeit into three substantial moments: the family, civil society and
the state. These designations have a relatively familiar meaning. The family is simply the domestic
sphere, which presents itself as a miniature Sittlichkeit within the larger one that encompasses all
of social life. That is because the family has its own customs, norms, beliefs and practices that
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function in the characteristic, only partly-conscious way.98 However, the family taken by itself is
neither complete nor self-subsistent. There is also civil society, which is the sphere of production
and private interests, which also has its own customs, norms, etc. The family and civil society are
caught up in a relation of both conflict and interdependence. The two spheres do not recognize
individuals according to the same principles, and so they continually undermine one another. From
the point of view of the family, the ways of civil society are harsh and unfeeling, from the point of
view of civil society, the ways of the family are weak and impractical. Yet the family needs civil
society to provide it with resources and civil society needs the family to provide it with workers.
Thus the two are caught in an endless deadlock. When civil society inevitably undermines the
family, e.g., separates its members from one another, it thereby also undermines itself, and vice
versa. Of course, this speaking of ‘the family’ and ‘civil society’ as though they were persons is
mostly metaphorical. Concretely, their deadlock means that any given individual is saddled with a
conflicting set of ethical commitments regarding its role in its family on the one hand and its role
in civil society on the other. Hegel thought that the greatness of Antigone was to depict this tragic
choice as embodied in the characters of Antigone and Creon, both of whom choose either the
family or civil society to the exclusion of the other, and both of whom fail both society and
themselves as a result. Because of the conflicting modes of recognition the individual receives
from the family and civil society, the individual is made self-conscious of his or herself as
belonging to an order that supersedes the family and civil society alike; this is the state.
The state stands above, so to speak, the family and civil society, and seeks to bring them
into harmony. It does this by recognizing the individual that transverses both. The state recognizes
individuals through law. Law is the essence of the state because it is that which gives the state and

98

Sigmund Freud did not invent the practice of using Sophocles to illustrate unconscious conflicts between family
members.

67
its branches a stable structure that is “protected against their [the particular branches] casual
subjectivity and against that of the individuals.”99 This is done through language since, for Hegel,
language “belongs ... to that which is inherently universal,”

100

meaning that language

automatically takes whatever particular content an individual wishes to express and transforms it,
with or without the individual’s consent, into a universal content. Thus the law, by taking the
unwritten customs of Sittlichkeit and putting them into language, makes the customs into selfconscious universals, i.e., laws, that are thereby recognized as such by all citizens and made
protected from the whim of any particular citizen. It is necessary for the law to be open and
transparent, that is, self-conscious, for it to be authoritative: “the positive form of Laws – to be
promulgated and known – is a condition of the external obligation to obey them.”101 The most
important part of the law, for Hegel, is the constitution. It is the constitution that makes the citizens
free by recognizing them as such. It defines the citizens as having certain rights, e.g., right to
property, right to life, equality before the law, etc. and thereby makes these rights, otherwise
abstract and ineffectual, actual. The constitution is thus the universal medium through which lawabiding citizens recognize others and themselves as free beings, endowed by their own conscious
willing with certain inalienable rights. Hegel sees law as that which actualizes freedom rather than
limits freedom because he sees every restriction on behavior, every negative duty, that law
mandates as carrying a positive aspect with it, which is a right: “to a right on my part corresponds
a duty in someone else.”102 Therefore, as long as a law is rational, the negative duty functions only
to prevent the base, unfree part of human nature from being satisfied while simultaneously
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recognizing the rational, free part of our nature and protecting the latter from the former. The role
of the state is then to complete the movement of Sittlichkeit, to be the medium in which the
collective recognizes its objective morality, codifies it, and makes it actual on Earth. By living out
this morality the individual overcomes his or her baseness and particularity and comes to live by
the universal light of Reason, that is, freely:

What dominates in the State is the spirit of the people, custom, and law. There man
is recognized and treated as a rational being, as free, as a person; and the individual,
on his side, makes himself worthy of his recognition by overcoming the natural
state of his self-consciousness and obeying a universal, the will that is in essence
and actuality will, the Law; he behaves, therefore, towards others in a manner that
is universally valid, recognizing them – as he wishes others to recognize him – as
free, as persons.103

The freest an individual can therefore be is as a recognized member of a rational state, and to
continually reproduce, maintain, and advanced the state through his or her actions. In this form of
life, which is Absolute Spirit and completed freedom, “freedom wills itself” (PR, 53).
Hegel’s conception of political freedom has often been criticized as backward or
contradictory due to its seeming disregard for individuals and naive trust in state power. Hegel
appears to think that the ideal individual is a conformist. Such a reading, however, misses the
affirmation of the individual in Hegel’s political philosophy. In the Lectures on History Hegel
says, “need, instinct, passion, private interest, even opinion and subjective representation ...
constitute the tools and means of the World Spirit for attaining its purpose” 104 – this purpose of
course being freedom. As we saw before, Sittlichkeit, and therefore the state, only takes shape out
of the complex collisions and compromises that occur between the private interests of individuals.
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This is why the only individuals that Hegel is fully dismissive of in his writings are ascetics, cynics,
beautiful souls, etc., i.e., those who refuse to participate in society. Hegel’s ideal individual is one
who lives out its private interests within the social field, making its influence felt and, above all,
does this with passion, since “nothing great in the world has been accomplished without
passion.”105 This valuation of passion and individuality reaches its apex in Hegel’s notion of the
world-historical individual. These individuals, such as Caesar and Napoleon, go beyond
maintaining the existing social order and revolutionize it. They do this by pursuing private ends,
but Hegel thinks that in their very particularity they unconsciously develop and actualize freedom:
“It is the same with all great historical individuals – their own particular purposes contain the
substantial will of the World Spirit.”106 Thus it is the individuals who throw themselves into private
ends without concern for precedent or convention that Hegel values above all others. It is also the
case that Hegel designates the state as the actualization of freedom because it is there that the
abstract person receives its full substantiality. Outside of the state, the individual is not recognized
as a coherent totality or as a free being endowed with rights. In the absence of a rational society,
individuals are “free” to kill and enslave one another, and strength alone, not the sanctity of the
abstract ‘I’ that constitutes individuality, is what guides the course of events. It is therefore only
in the rational state that individuality has the force of the law behind it to make its freedom a potent
actuality. Therefore Hegel’s political philosophy does not at all disregard the individual, but it
simply conceptualizes the individual’s role in the state and the state’s responsibility toward the
individual in different terms than those used in classical liberalism.
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As regards Hegel’s naive trust in state power, here we must recall, in addition to the
rational/actual principle, the Heraclitean character of Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel
Being itself is unstable and self-negating, and with it all particular beings, notions and societies.
Everything contains disparate and conflicting principles within itself, and societies are perhaps
even the paradigm case of this. The conflicts between individuals and between institutions within
the state embody the conflicting forces within the abstract spiritual structure of the state. The state
is a dynamic, nearly chaotic unity, which struggles constantly to integrate the private ends within
it. Hegel believes that all states are therefore destined to collapse or transform, and that this process
is world history:

The principles of the spirits of nations are in general of a limited nature because of
that particularity in which they have their objective actuality and self-consciousness
as existent individuals, and their deeds and destinies in their mutual relations are
the manifest dialectic of the finitude of these spirits. It is through this dialectic that
the universal spirit, the spirit of the world, produces itself in its freedom from all
limits, and it is this spirit which exercises its right – which is the highest right of all
– over the finite spirits in world history as the world’s court of judgment.107

The state is the actualization of freedom, but not in its stability and absolute authority, but rather
in its dynamic development in the history of Spirit. The state’s dynamism is the effect and
responsibility of individuals, especially the free individuals who will freedom, that is, who make
the state adapt to recognize the freedom of every individual living under it. If anything, Hegel’s
naivety lies in his trust in the conscience and passion of individuals. He certainly believes that
history is not without collapses and catastrophes, that it is ultimately a “slaughter-bench,” but also
that the cruel and the unjust forms of society will prove themselves to be less stable and effective
than the rational and just forms because individuals will fight for the recognition of their freedom.
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If they do not, Hegel argues that they are subordinating their freedom to their natural being, and
that therefore they do not have in-themselves any freedom that is being suppressed. That final
point is either harsh, cheap or profound depending on one’s outlook.
Now that we have a tentative outline of Hegel’s philosophy of the State we can return to
the question posed at the outset, namely, whether Hegel’s conceptions of freedom as reconciliation
and freedom as the state are compatible with one another. Before addressing this question directly
we can draw out the commonalities between the two and see if there is a unified conception of
freedom underlying them. Both reconciliation and the state qua freedom are centered around the
abstract ‘I’ and its appearance in actuality through recognition. In reconciliation self and other
mutually recognize the abstract ‘I’ not only as their common essence but as their shared essence,
as that which encompasses the being of each in the shape of intersubjective self-consciousness.
The actuality of this recognition is the linguistic expression of reconciliation. In the state the
abstract ‘I’ is recognized as the basis of the legal person, and everyone is treated as having a certain
equality and set of rights deriving therefrom. The actuality of this recognition is in the written law
and its enforcement. In both of these cases the abstract ‘I’ is made through recognition into an
effective force or object in the actual world and thereby becomes a determinant of action that is
distinct from the natural dimension of human existence, though not disconnected from it. Such
recognition must be collective and its collectivity is derived from the intersubjective nature of selfconsciousness. So far as the material here considered is concerned, that appears to be the nature of
Hegelian freedom.
Another similarity between reconciliation and the state is that they appear, dialectically, as
the determinate negation of conscience. Reconciliation appears with the recognition by conscience
that it, conscience, cannot provide a basis for moral judgment. In this discovery the amoral
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character of conscience is revealed to itself. Conscience, as individuated, cuts itself off from other
people and obscures its equality and continuity with them, even while other people are the essence
of morality and self-consciousness, and thus conscience itself. When conscience, as conscience,
recognizes its moral failure it passes into reconciliation, wherein the barriers established through
moral conviction are lifted and otherness is sublated, i.e., the shape of otherness persists only as
the precondition of its self-negation. The state appears with the recognition of conscience as an
empty formalism. Conscience is nothing other than the passage of immediate moral sentiments
through the abstract ‘I’. As individuated, the abstract ‘I’ is entirely indeterminate and thus
incapable, again, of providing a basis for moral judgment. It is only in the collective spirit of
Sittlichkeit that the individual ‘I’ receives filling and determination. Thus in the state, conscience
must once again abandon its individual shape and integrate itself with the historical development
of the law, which is the product of Spirit and not that of any particular individual. In reconciliation
as freedom and the state as freedom alike we then see an underlying critique by Hegel of
individualistic morality. The individuals are “the tools and means of the World Spirit for attaining
its purpose” and therefore the raw matter that loses its substantiality in being taken into the form
of freedom. The individual as such is for Hegel merely a clever animal, one that is selfish,
appetitive, subjective and thereby yet incapable of culture, history or rationality. It is only through
participation in the dialectical development of self-consciousness that the individual overcomes
itself and is inducted into the extra-natural, or spiritual, behaviors that constitute the actuality of
human freedom. We might say that Hegelian freedom is the possession of the human body by
Spirit. Such a collectivist conception of freedom and morality necessarily contains a rejection of
individualistic moralities, that is, moral systems such as utilitarianism and Kantianism, which
allow the individual to generate moral judgments while locked within itself, and to consult only
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the virtual Other present in the formal universality of the system. Conscience, for Hegel, is the
truth, i.e., the fundamental structure, of all individualistic moralities. The truth of conscience is its
dissolution, and that appears in the Phenomenology as reconciliation, and in the later Hegel as the
state.
Despite their underlying similarities, reconciliation and the state remain markedly
different. Reconciliation appears as a kind of endpoint for moral action. Once one is ‘reconciled’
to those in one’s community, there is nothing further to do but to continually repeat the
reconciliatory process. Reconciliation also does not provide a total schema for living one’s life
freely. Most of the activities that occupy daily life are simply not amenable to assuming an
explicitly reconciliatory structure like the one described in the Phenomenology. The state, by
contrast, does provide a total, dynamic lived schema for free living. The function of the state is to
integrate the disparate moments of the family and civil society, and to recognize the individual at
a higher, all-encompassing level of abstraction. The state also facilitates justice and punishment,
and thereby allows judgment to be passed on individuals by the collective through institutions,
something reconciliation is of course incapable of doing. The state also passes over into world
history. It is thus of itself open to the potential for an indefinite development of its form, whereas
reconciliation, being formally far simpler than the state, is not. Above all, reconciliation, while
negating individualistic morality, nonetheless remains within the frame of conscience; it is, so to
speak, a ‘first person’ shape of Spirit. By contrast, the state is a collective shape of Spirit. It appears
that, despite the fact that there is a generic Hegelian conception of freedom that grounds both
reconciliation and the state, Hegel may have simply changed his mind in the passage from the
Phenomenology to the Encyclopedia as to what constitutes the manifestation of Absolute Spirit,
and thus the highest expression of freedom.
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Nevertheless, there is a further parallel between reconciliation and the state that we have
not yet addressed. The dialectic of the Phenomenology passes from reconciliation to the chapter
on Religion, and likewise the dialectics of the Encyclopedia and Lectures on History pass from the
State as such to “The Religious Foundation of the State.”108 Unfortunately, Hegel’s philosophy of
religion cannot receive just treatment here. Nevertheless, whether or not one accepts the
comprehensiveness of Hegel’s ‘system’, he did succeed in making it nearly impossible to discuss
any one part of his thought without bringing everything else in, and so the relation between
reconciliation and the state cannot be properly understood without dealing, if in truncated form,
with his philosophy of religion. First, it is necessary to see the idiosyncratic nature of what Hegel
means by ‘religion’. For example, Hegel takes Athenian athletics to be a shape of religion. Hegel
has a universalist conception of religion, that is, he takes every religion to be the same in its
essential content, and he therefore determines something to be a religion on the basis of whether
it expresses this content, and not from its outward appearance or whether it is conventionally
considered to be a religion. For Hegel, religion is “absolute Being in and for itself, the selfconsciousness of Spirit,”109 meaning that religious art, architecture, rituals, literature, etc. are the
concretized self-consciousness of Absolute Spirit. Hegel’s conception of religion follows from his
thesis that Absolute Spirit is God. As we have seen, Hegel conceives of Spirit as: the selfconsciousness of self-alienated Nature, the providential author of history, the source of reason and
morality, and the immaterial, unchanging substance that maintains itself in its essential unity
through its activity and the flux of the world. In his Science of Logic Hegel also argues that
Absolute Spirit is the formal cause of the transcendental structure of thought and reality. On the
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basis of these characteristics, Hegel takes it to be self-evident that the intersubjective, collective
imagination of humanity across history is the mind of God. Otherwise put, human beings are the
part of reality that has developed self-consciousness, and therefore, insofar as humanity is selfconscious, humanity is the self-consciousness of all of reality, i.e., the Absolute. As we have seen,
the determinate self-consciousness of Spirit is inextricably tied to the actuality of Spirit, or
humanity’s historical condition. Thus, the self-consciousness of God develops along with the
development of human society. From the human perspective, historical developments have given
rise to new and developing forms of religion and religious ideas, from the divine perspective,
“World History is the exhibition of Spirit striving to attain knowledge of its own nature.” 110
Therefore the developing self-consciousness of Absolute Spirit is made concrete in the historical
development of the various world religions. In sum, because human consciousness is the selfconsciousness of the Absolute, our evolving conceptions of the nature of God are one and the same
as God’s evolving self-consciousness. This is where many readers, including Kierkegaard, Marx
and Russell, put down their Hegel book.
However, we must not lose sight of the double-identification Hegel is making in his
philosophy of religion. Hegel is not only saying that Spirit is God, but also that God is Spirit. Thus
Hegel’s God is not a supreme being existing somewhere outside the world, which listens to prayers
and intervenes on natural phenomena, or which possess a ready-made corpus of absolute
knowledge that it metes out to specific individuals through divine inspiration. Rather, Hegel’s God
is immanent reality insofar as immanent reality is self-transcending. This is how Hegel manages
to offend religious people like Kierkegaard and atheists like Marx and Russell in equal part – in
the Philosophy of Spirit Hegel remarks that philosophy is accused of both having “too little of
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God” and “too much of him.” 111 Hegel’s peculiar conception of divinity does place him
somewhere between what we would today call atheism and mysticism, even though he tries to
make a Christian theologian out of himself. Hegel calls Christianity the “Revealed Religion” and
argues that “it was through Christianity that [universal freedom] came into the world [because]
according to Christianity the individual as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine
love, destined as spirit to live in absolute relation with God himself, and have God’s mind dwelling
in him, i.e., man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom.”112 Hegel’s justifies his claim to being
a Christian through his understanding of religious expression as ‘picture-thoughts’
[Vorstellungen]. Hegel believes that religion expresses absolute self-consciousness pictorially and
emotionally, and that it is the work of philosophy to raise the content of religion into the free
universality of pure, articulated thought. Thus he argues that the Christian narrative depicts in
picture-thoughts how the Absolute Idea (Father) must be ‘incarnated’ in the consciousness of the
individual (Son), and then the individual must be negated (crucified) before the Absolute Idea
enters into the self-consciousness of the communal Spirit (Holy Spirit). The cogency of Hegel’s
reading aside, the fact remains that Hegel’s status as a Christian thinker, in any conventional sense,
must be rejected despite his insistence to the contrary.113 Hegel goes so far as to criticize the very
sayings of Jesus:
“The precept of religion, ‘Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is
God’s’ is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar’s, what belongs to
secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the
ecclesiastical authority have claimed almost everything for their own.”114
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It is clear then that Hegel’s universalism extends beyond Christianity, so that his own philosophy
of Spirit is meant to supersede Christian doctrine. Therefore, when he speaks about religion as the
foundation of the state, he is speaking about self-conscious Spirit, as his own philosophy
understands it, as the foundation of the state. The important qualification being that, again, religion
is pictorial and emotional according to Hegel. The power Hegel sees in religion, especially in
Christianity, is its ability to structure the emotional life of Sittlichkeit according to the selfconsciousness of Spirit.
When Hegel says that religion is the foundation of the state he is making two related points.
First, he is making a relatively simple historical point:
The nature of [a people’s] religion determines that of the State and its constitution.
It [the latter] has originated from it: the Athenian and the Roman state were possible
only through the specific paganism of these peoples, just as a Catholic state has a
spirit and constitution different from a Protestant one.115
Hegel’s other point is that the emotional character of Sittlichkeit is determined by its religious
consciousness, and that this in turn influences the structure of Sittlichkeit. This means that a given
society will tend to actualize its spiritual convictions, regardless if any individual is conscious of
these spiritual convictions, and that the degree of freedom achievable by a given society is
predetermined by the degree of spiritual self-consciousness, i.e., self-consciousness of freedom,
that prevails in its religious life. For example, Hegel argues that freedom is limited in Indian society
because of the religious significance of the caste system. Thus Hegel thinks that a people will not
put up with having laws that lag behind the freedom that is self-conscious in their religion, and
neither will they let their laws go further:
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Opposed to what religion pronounces holy, the laws appear something made by
human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced, they
could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the religious
spirit. Such laws, however sound their provisions may be, thus founder on the
conscience, whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and refuses to
sanction them.116
All of this follows from what we have been seeing since the Lordship and Bondage dialectic. As
we have seen, Hegel argues that the dialectical development of the abstract ‘I’, as Spirit, redirects
our natural drives and emotions toward extra-natural ends. Hegel simply thinks that religion is one
piece of this, and that it contains the most abstract element of a given people’s self-consciousness
in emotional and pictorial form. It is as though religion expresses the way in which a people
conceives of itself in relation to its individuals, its collective, Nature and the Spirit that connects
all of them in extracted, condensed and poeticized form. It follows from this that there is bound to
be a correspondence between the social organization of Sittlichkeit and religious life because they
ultimately derive from the same collective self-consciousness or Spirit. Hegel does, however, take
religion to be a more immediate representation of the self-consciousness of Spirit than the social
forms of Sittlichkeit.
Religion, as the self-consciousness of Absolute Spirit, is also the foundation of morality.
Hegel concludes his discussion of morality in the Phenomenology with the following passage:
The reconciling Yea, in which the two ‘I’s let go their antithetical existence, is the
existence of the ‘I’ which has expanded into a duality, and therein remains identical
with itself, and, in its complete externalization and opposite, possesses the certainty
of itself: it is God manifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the
form of pure knowledge.117
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Hegel then pivots on this passage to the ‘Religion’ chapter of the Phenomenology. Since
reconciliation, as the negation of otherness through identification with the other, appears at the end
of the dialectic of morality, we know that reconciliation is in fact the absolute basis and final cause
of all preceding shapes of morality. Because reconciliation is God, Hegel is here arguing that, after
all, God is the ultimate legislator of morality. We can understand this in terms of conscience. In
conscience the moral conviction arises immediately, without deliberation, and it is unclear what
the true source of the conviction is. As we saw, the conviction comes from Sittlichkeit and the long
history of self-consciousness out of which Sittlichkeit develops. At the center of Sittlichkeit we
find religion, wherein are contained the deepest and most abstract determinations of the communal
self-consciousness. Religion therefore underpins morality and the State in equal measure, as is
thereby that which makes them one:

It is evident and apparent from what has preceded that moral life is the State
retracted into its inner heart and substance, while the State is the organization and
actualization of moral life; and that Religion is the very substance of the moral life
itself and of the State ... If Religion then is the consciousness of absolute truth, then
whatever is to rank as right and justice, as law and duty, i.e., as true in the world of
free will, can be so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth, as it is subsumed
under it as its sequel … The body of religious truth, as the pure self-subsisting and
therefore supreme truth, exercises a sanction over moral life which lies in empirical
actuality. Thus for self-consciousness religion is the basis of moral life and of the
State.118

Morality is the actuality of the self-consciousness of Spirit in the shape of the individual, and the
State is the actuality of the self-consciousness of Spirit in the shape of the collective. The fullest
realization of these two interpenetrating moments appears with reconciliation and the rational State
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respectively, and in their appearance Absolute Spirit attains self-consciousness in its traversing
and encompassing of the two moments.
Before we disregard Hegel as a mystic, an absolutist theocrat, or any other number of things
that would relegate Hegelianism to the heap of philosophical anachronisms that precede our postDarwinian era of restrained rationality and naturalistic clarity, we should recall what Hegel
believes the ultimate content of religion to be: none other than his theory of freedom as explicated
in the preceding. Hegel’s emphasis on the role of religion in freedom is merely to say that it is
necessary for people to feel that they are connected to each other in a way that allows for mutual
recognition. Hegel’s free society is one in which people feel themselves, along with their fellows,
to be part of the divine process through which reality comes to know itself, and to therefore
recognize all people, irrespective of their outward conditions, to be themselves divine. In such a
condition there is no abdication of responsibility to a retributive afterlife, or deferral of judgment
to the Supreme Being or its representatives, or claims to secret wisdom from a supernatural
authority: if God is only manifest in and through human activity then there is no higher court and
no higher justification than our own judgments and our present social condition. Such an
acceptance of responsibility does not, however, resign us to cheap existential despair or nihilism,
for, as Hegel says, every responsibility is equally a privilege. In Hegel’s eyes, we have been
granted the highest responsibility and privilege there is: Self-Consciousness – to safeguard and
cultivate it. Thus there is in fact a telos to life, freedom, to which all other ends must be
subordinated, and it is imbued with the same divinity that the religions of history have ascribed to
their deities. Freedom requires, first of all, that we recognize that we need others from the very
foundation of our being, that others just as equally need us, and that withdrawal from this need
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leads only to spiritual starvation. And here we see philosophy return again to the usual punchline,
that the only thing that makes life worth living is love.
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